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#### Obama has won the Iran fight now, but faces continued opposition

Michael Crittenden, WSJ, 2/4/14, Congress Eases Standoff With White House Over Iran Sanctions, online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304851104579363372176271460

The Obama administration appeared to be prevailing in its effort to persuade lawmakers to give U.S. diplomacy with Iran a chance, but faced continued skepticism from senatorsat a hearing Tuesday.

Senior aides said pressure on Senate leaders to allow a vote on new sanctions has eased in recent weeks, as lawmakers gauge the effectiveness of an interim deal reached in November between Iran and world powers.

But while many lawmakers said they were willing to give diplomacy time to work, Democrats and Republicans alike said the stakes were high if talks fail.

"If these negotiations fail, there are two grim alternatives, a nuclear Iran, or war, or perhaps both," said Sen. Richard Durbin (D., Ill.), a Senate Foreign Relations Committee member.

The White House and lawmakers have wrestled over the issue for months. Many in Congress support new sanctions, while the administration insists such a step would disrupt high-level negotiations with Tehran. A six-month deal provides Iran with relief from international sanctions in exchange for enhanced inspections and Tehran's agreement to halt or roll back parts of its nuclear program.

Sen. Robert Menendez (D., N.J.), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, argued the agreement provides Iran with economic benefits that outpace what Western governments have received in return. He said he remained concerned Iran would never agree to fully put aside its nuclear ambitions.

"I am convinced that we should only relieve pressure on Iran in return for verifiable concessions that will fundamentally dismantle Iran's nuclear program," Mr. Menendez said.

A top State Department official argued that any move by the U.S. to impose new sanctions would risk unraveling the international talks. "It is crucial we give diplomacy a chance to succeed," Wendy Sherman, the State Department undersecretary of political affairs, told the Foreign Relations panel.

President Barack Obama and his administration have urged lawmakers to hold off on additional actions. Mr. Obama vowed in his State of the Union address to veto any bill "that threatens to derail these talks."

Lawmakers have bristled at some of the White House criticism, particularly the suggestion that those seeking more sanctions were in favor of war. Sen. Timothy Kaine (D., Va.), addressing those complaints Tuesday, said that those who support new sanctions "are not pro-war and those that oppose it are not soft on Iran or anti-Israel."

#### Economic engagement with Mexico is politically divisive despite supporters

Wilson 13 – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, the choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

#### Causes Israel strikes

Jon Perr 12/24/13**,** B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University; technology marketing consultant based in Portland, Oregon, has long been active in Democratic politics and public policy as an organizer and advisor in California and Massachusetts. His past roles include field staffer for Gary Hart for President (1984), organizer of Silicon Valley tech executives backing President Clinton's call for national education standards (1997), recruiter of tech executives for Al Gore's and John Kerry's presidential campaigns, and co-coordinator of MassTech for Robert Reich (2002).(Jon, “Senate sanctions bill could let Israel take U.S. to war against Iran” Daily Kos, [http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran#](http://www.dailykos.com/story/2013/12/24/1265184/-Senate-sanctions-bill-could-let-Israel-take-U-S-to-war-against-Iran)

As 2013 draws to close, the negotiations over the Iranian nuclear program have entered a delicate stage. But in 2014, the tensions will escalate dramatically as a bipartisan group of Senators brings a new Iran sanctions bill to the floor for a vote. As many others have warned, that promise of new measures against Tehran will almost certainly blow up the interim deal reached by the Obama administration and its UN/EU partners in Geneva. But Congress' highly unusual intervention into the President's domain of foreign policy doesn't just make the prospect of an American conflict with Iran more likely. As it turns out, the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act essentially empowers Israel to decide whether the United States will go to war against Tehran.¶ On their own, the tough new sanctions imposed automatically if a final deal isn't completed in six months pose a daunting enough challenge for President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry. But it is the legislation's commitment to support an Israeli preventive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities that almost ensures the U.S. and Iran will come to blows. As Section 2b, part 5 of the draft mandates:¶ If the Government of Israel is compelled to take military action in legitimate self-defense against Iran's nuclear weapon program, the United States Government should stand with Israel and provide, in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force, diplomatic, military, and economic support to the Government of Israel in its defense of its territory, people, and existence.¶ Now, the legislation being pushed by Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL), Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) does not automatically give the President an authorization to use force should Israel attack the Iranians. (The draft language above explicitly states that the U.S. government must act "in accordance with the law of the United States and the constitutional responsibility of Congress to authorize the use of military force.") But there should be little doubt that an AUMF would be forthcoming from Congressmen on both sides of the aisle. As Lindsey Graham, who with Menendez co-sponsored a similar, non-binding "stand with Israel" resolution in March told a Christians United for Israel (CUFI) conference in July:¶ "If nothing changes in Iran, come September, October, I will present a resolution that will authorize the use of military force to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear bomb."¶ Graham would have plenty of company from the hardest of hard liners in his party. In August 2012, Romney national security adviser and pardoned Iran-Contra architect Elliott Abrams called for a war authorization in the pages of the Weekly Standard. And just two weeks ago, Norman Podhoretz used his Wall Street Journal op-ed to urge the Obama administration to "strike Iran now" to avoid "the nuclear war sure to come."¶ But at the end of the day, the lack of an explicit AUMF in the Nuclear Weapon Free Iran Act doesn't mean its supporters aren't giving Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu de facto carte blanche to hit Iranian nuclear facilities. The ensuing Iranian retaliation against to Israeli and American interests would almost certainly trigger the commitment of U.S. forces anyway.¶ Even if the Israelis alone launched a strike against Iran's atomic sites, Tehran will almost certainly hit back against U.S. targets in the Straits of Hormuz, in the region, possibly in Europe and even potentially in the American homeland. Israel would face certain retaliation from Hezbollah rockets launched from Lebanon and Hamas missiles raining down from Gaza.¶ That's why former Bush Defense Secretary Bob Gates and CIA head Michael Hayden raising the alarms about the "disastrous" impact of the supposedly surgical strikes against the Ayatollah's nuclear infrastructure. As the New York Times reported in March 2012, "A classified war simulation held this month to assess the repercussions of an Israeli attack on Iran forecasts that the strike would lead to a wider regional war, which could draw in the United States and leave hundreds of Americans dead, according to American officials." And that September, a bipartisan group of U.S. foreign policy leaders including Brent Scowcroft, retired Admiral William Fallon, former Republican Senator (now Obama Pentagon chief) Chuck Hagel, retired General Anthony Zinni and former Ambassador Thomas Pickering concluded that American attacks with the objective of "ensuring that Iran never acquires a nuclear bomb" would "need to conduct a significantly expanded air and sea war over a prolonged period of time, likely several years." (Accomplishing regime change, the authors noted, would mean an occupation of Iran requiring a "commitment of resources and personnel greater than what the U.S. has expended over the past 10 years in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars combined.") The anticipated blowback?¶ Serious costs to U.S. interests would also be felt over the longer term, we believe, with problematic consequences for global and regional stability, including economic stability. A dynamic of escalation, action, and counteraction could produce serious unintended consequences that would significantly increase all of these costs and lead, potentially, to all-out regional war.

#### Great power war

Rafael Reuveny 10, PhD, Professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, "Unilateral Strike on Iran could trigger world Depression", Op-ed distributed through McClatchy Newspaper Co, <http://www.indiana.edu/~spea/news/speaking_out/reuveny_on_unilateral_strike_Iran.shtml>

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash. For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force. Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground. All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians, but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well. By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early-warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces. Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike — or even numerous strikes — could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond. A regional war Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981**,** Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents. Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat. In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973. An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe. The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony. Replaying Nixon’s nightmare Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario. Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted. If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force.

¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.

## Off

#### Interpretation—“economic engagement” means the aff must be an exclusively economic action

Jakstaite 10 - Doctoral Candidate Vytautas Magnus University Faculty of Political Sciences and Diplomacy (Lithuania) (Gerda, “CONTAINMENT AND ENGAGEMENT AS MIDDLE-RANGE THEORIES” BALTIC JOURNAL OF LAW & POLITICS VOLUME 3, NUMBER 2 (2010), DOI: 10.2478/v10076-010-0015-7)

The approach to engagement as economic engagement focuses exclusively on economic instruments of foreign policy with the main national interest being security. Economic engagement is a policy of the conscious development of economic relations with the adversary in order to change the target state‟s behaviour and to improve bilateral relations.94 Economic engagement is academically wielded in several respects. It recommends that the state engage the target country in the international community (with the there existing rules) and modify the target state‟s run foreign policy, thus preventing the emergence of a potential enemy.95 Thus, this strategy aims to ensure safety in particular, whereas economic benefit is not a priority objective. Objectives of economic engagement indicate that this form of engagement is designed for relations with problematic countries – those that pose a potential danger to national security of a state that implements economic engagement. Professor of the University of California Paul Papayoanou and University of Maryland professor Scott Kastner say that economic engagement should be used in relations with the emerging powers: countries which accumulate more and more power, and attempt a new division of power in the international system – i.e., pose a serious challenge for the status quo in the international system (the latter theorists have focused specifically on China-US relations). These theorists also claim that economic engagement is recommended in relations with emerging powers whose regimes are not democratic – that is, against such players in the international system with which it is difficult to agree on foreign policy by other means.96 Meanwhile, other supporters of economic engagement (for example, professor of the University of California Miles Kahler) are not as categorical and do not exclude the possibility to realize economic engagement in relations with democratic regimes.97 Proponents of economic engagement believe that the economy may be one factor which leads to closer relations and cooperation (a more peaceful foreign policy and the expected pledge to cooperate) between hostile countries – closer economic ties will develop the target state‟s dependence on economic engagement implementing state for which such relations will also be cost-effective (i.e., the mutual dependence). However, there are some important conditions for the economic factor in engagement to be effective and bring the desired results. P. Papayoanou and S. Kastner note that economic engagement gives the most positive results when initial economic relations with the target state is minimal and when the target state‟s political forces are interested in development of international economic relations. Whether economic relations will encourage the target state to develop more peaceful foreign policy and willingness to cooperate will depend on the extent to which the target state‟s forces with economic interests are influential in internal political structure. If the target country‟s dominant political coalition includes the leaders or groups interested in the development of international economic relations, economic ties between the development would bring the desired results. Academics note that in non-democratic countries in particular leaders often have an interest to pursue economic cooperation with the powerful economic partners because that would help them maintain a dominant position in their own country.98 Proponents of economic engagement do not provide a detailed description of the means of this form of engagement, but identify a number of possible variants of engagement: conditional economic engagement, using the restrictions caused by economic dependency and unconditional economic engagement by exploiting economic dependency caused by the flow. Conditional economic engagement, sometimes called linkage or economic carrots engagement, could be described as conflicting with economic sanctions. A state that implements this form of engagement instead of menacing to use sanctions for not changing policy course promises for a target state to provide more economic benefits in return for the desired political change. Thus, in this case economic ties are developed depending on changes in the target state‟s behaviour.99 Unconditional economic engagement is more moderate form of engagement. Engagement applying state while developing economic relations with an adversary hopes that the resulting economic dependence over time will change foreign policy course of the target state and reduce the likelihood of armed conflict. Theorists assume that economic dependence may act as a restriction of target state‟s foreign policy or as transforming factor that changes target state‟s foreign policy objectives.100 Thus, economic engagement focuses solely on economic measures (although theorists do not give a more detailed description), on strategically important actors of the international arena and includes other types of engagement, such as the conditional-unconditional economic engagement.

#### Energy is non-economic engagement

**Australian Government, 11** (“The White Paper and Australia’s Strategic Relationship with China”, 9/28

<http://asiancentury.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/public-submissions/nd.doc>

Australia risks losing a healthy relationship with Asia due to overdependence on trade relations and shortcomings of soft power. As trade and economic ties continue to grow between Australia and China, non-economic bilateral relations must be improved in order for general engagement to remain stable. To keep pace with the Asian Century, Australia must strive to find greater common ground with China outside of trade and commerce. The White Paper should take into consideration issues of non-economic relations in order to fully address Australia’s long term relationship with China. Some possible considerations for the White Paper to take into account in building a strategy for improving non-economic engagement with China: Increased frequency of diplomatic visits and high-level visits; building a policy for minimum frequency and level of such diplomatic engagement Increasing volume and breadth of non-diplomatic high-level exchanges such as academic conferences, exchange trips between sister agencies, and two-way exchanges between schools by dramatically increasing government funding or subsidization of such engagement Encouraging bilateral cooperation and partnerships between non-economically driven organisations such as public sector agencies and think tanks for the purpose of fostering mutual investments between China and Australia where more than trade or profit is in question Encouraging cultural literacy in the Australian population through people-to-people exchange, tourism, and language training; in particular encouraging Mandarin study for non-heritage students from an early age Increasing funding for China-Australia partnerships on development in science, math, energy, environment and technology; mitigating the risk and impact of China’s capabilities surpassing those of Australia in the near future Cultivating soft power through aid funding and development projects

#### Voting issue—

#### Limits—they explode the topic—blurring the lines between economic and other forms of engagement makes any interaction with another country topical—it’s impossible to predict or prepare

## Off

#### Interpretation—economic engagement is a subset of conditional engagement and implies a quid pro quo

Shinn 96 [James Shinn, C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asia at the CFR in New York City and director of the council’s multi-year Asia Project, worked on economic affairs in the East Asia Bureau of the US Dept of State, “Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China,” pp. 9 and 11, google books]

In sum, conditional engagement consists of a set of objectives, a strategy for attaining those objectives, and tactics (specific policies) for implementing that strategy.

The objectives of conditional engagement are the ten principles, which were selected to preserve American vital interests in Asia while accommodating China’s emergence as a major power.

The overall strategy of conditional engagement follows two parallel lines: economic engagement, to promote the integration of China into the global trading and financial systems; and security engagement, to encourage compliance with the ten principles by diplomatic and military means when economic incentives do not suffice, in order to hedge against the risk of the emergence of a belligerent China.

The tactics of economic engagement should promote China’s economic integration through negotiations on trade liberalization, institution building, and educational exchanges. While a carrots-and-sticks approach may be appropriate within the economic arena, the use of trade sanction to achieve short-term political goals is discouraged.

The tactics of security engagement should reduce the risks posed by China’s rapid military expansion, its lack of transparency, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and transnational problems such as crime and illegal migration, by engaging in arms control negotiations, multilateral efforts, and a loosely-structured defensive military arrangement in Asia.8

[To footnotes]

8. Conditional engagement’s recommended tactics of tit-for-tat responses are equivalent to using carrots and sticks in response to foreign policy actions by China. Economic engagement calls for what is described as symmetric tit-for-tat and security engagement for asymmetric tit-for-tat. A symmetric response is one that counters a move by China in the same place, time, and manner; an asymmetric response might occur in another place at another time, and perhaps in another manner. A symmetric tit-for-tat would be for Washington to counter a Chinese tariff of 10 percent on imports for the United States with a tariff of 10 percent on imports from China. An asymmetric tit-for-tat would be for the United States to counter a Chines shipment of missiles to Iran with an American shipment of F-16s to Vietnam (John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy. New York: Oxford University Press, (1982). This is also cited in Fareed Zakaria, “The Reagan Strategy of Containment,” Political Science Quarterly 105, no. 3 (1990), pp. 383-88).

#### Violation—the aff is unilateral action

#### Voter for limits—topic snowballs into countless unilateral affs based on small subsets of engagement in each of the topic countries—literally limitless

## Off

#### Interpretation---the United States is the three branches of the federal government

The Free Dictionary, no date, “U.S” <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/U.S>. Accessed July 7, 2010

Noun 1.U.S. - the executive and legislative and judicial branches of the federal government of the United States

#### Violation---they over-specify their agent---that means they’re not topical because they’re not a USFG action

#### Explodes predictable limits---specifying your agent allows you to pick anyone in the government which is fundamentally impossible to predict---potential abuse is a voter it’s a question of what you justify even if your aff is reasonable

## Off

#### Chinese influence is increasing and replacing Mexico’s need for US involvement

Shahani ’13 – Arjan, “Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Visit to Mexico,” AQ, 6/5/13, <http://www.americasquarterly.org/chinese-president-xi-jinping-visit-to-mexico>

Slowly but surely, from a diplomatic standpoint, Mexico is taking steps to reestablish itself as an outspoken, independent and active player, and is engaging emerging and established world powers beyond its neighbor to the North. In April, Peña Nieto’s participation in the conference of the Boao Forum For Asia—a China-based forum similar to the World Economic Forum—and Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Mexico this week are a clear example of Mexico’s global pivot. President Xi’s visit, foreshadows a stronger bilateral commercial and diplomatic relationship. Fox and Calderón did very little to maintain the strategic alliance that the PRI had built with China, and Calderón angered the Chinese government in 2011 when he received the Dalai Lama at the presidential residence. But now, officials from the federal government and representatives from the private sector involved in President Xi’s visit are predicting the launch of a strategic, integral and functional alliance between China and Mexico. They are not exaggerating: as agreements reached during the visit show, this is much more than Xi making a courtesy call. Amapola Grijalva, vice president of the Mexico-China Chamber of Commerce, told journalist Darío Celis in a June 3 radio interview that “agreements reached between the two delegations will help narrow the commercial balance gap between the countries, will open up a huge market for Mexican exporters, and will allow China to provide financing for important heavy infrastructure projects in the near future.” Grijalva estimates that “during Peña’s administration, up to $81 billion coming from China could go into financing new industrial naval port complexes, airports, telecom projects, and railway transportation systems.” A joint declaration signed and issued by Peña Nieto and Xi on June 4 summarizes the amount of work already invested in the renewed Mexico-China relationship. The two leaders signed memorandums of understanding to formally establish cooperation in energy, mining, emerging industries, infrastructure, private sector collaboration, university alliances, trade, banking, and even the oil industry. In addition, it was announced that sanitary measures have been met to reopen the Chinese market to pork from Mexico, and an agreement was reached to allow all forms of tequila into China. Additionally, to promote tourism in both countries, Peña Nieto and Xi expressed their mutual interest in expanding international flights connecting Mexico and China and in establishing a working relationship between their tourism ministries. In the political arena, Peña Nieto took the opportunity to amend Calderón’s diplomatic gaffe by ratifying the “One China” principle. Peña Nieto stated that it is Mexico’s position that both Taiwan and the Tibet are part of Chinese territory and Tibetan affairs are an internal issue for China. In the statement, both parties declared that “given the improvement of diverse mechanisms in the bilateral cooperation, the conditions are such that Mexico-China relations can be elevated to a new level of benefit to both nations.” They also established a calendar of working visits from high-level government officials to implement the agreements and scheduled future meetings during upcoming international forums including the UN, APEC and the G20. As President Xi’s visit shows, the coming years are certain to bring Mexico and China diplomatically closer and to catalyze economic growth, trade and development in a mutually beneficial way—while breaking Mexico’s trade dependency on the U.S. market.

#### Engagement is zero-sum

Dowd ‘12

Alan Dowd, Senior Fellow with the American Security Council Foundation, 2012, “Crisis in the America's,” <http://www.ascfusa.org/content_pages/view/crisisinamericas>

Reengagement also means revitalizing security ties. A good model to follow might be what’s happening in China’s backyard. To deter China and prevent an accidental war, the U.S. is reviving its security partnerships all across the Asia-Pacific region. Perhaps it’s time to do the same in Latin America. We should remember that many Latin American countries—from Mexico and Panama to Colombia and Chile—border the Pacific. Given Beijing’s actions, it makes sense to bring these Latin American partners on the Pacific Rim into the alliance of alliances that is already stabilizing the Asia-Pacific region.¶ Finally, all of this needs to be part of a revived Monroe Doctrine.¶ Focusing on Chinese encroachment in the Americas, this “Monroe Doctrine 2.0” would make it clear to Beijing that the United States welcomes China’s efforts to conduct trade in the Americas but discourages any claims of control—implied or explicit—by China over territories, properties or facilities in the Americas. In addition, Washington should make it clear to Beijing that the American people would look unfavorably upon the sale of Chinese arms or the basing of Chinese advisors or military assets in the Western Hemisphere.¶ In short, what it was true in the 19th and 20th centuries must remain true in the 21st: There is room for only one great power in the Western Hemisphere.

#### Decline collapses the CCP

Li, “China’s Team of Rivals” March/April ‘9

(Cheng, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story\_id=4686)

The two dozen senior politicians who walk the halls of Zhongnanhai, the compound of the Chinese Communist Party’s leadership in Beijing, are worried. What was inconceivable a year ago now threatens their rule: an economy in freefall. Exports, critical to China’s searing economic growth, have plunged. Thousands of factories and businesses, especially those in the prosperous coastal regions, have closed. In the last six months of 2008, 10 million workers, plus 1 million new college graduates, joined the already gigantic ranks of the country’s unemployed. During the same period, the Chinese stock market lost 65 percent of its value, equivalent to $3 trillion. The crisis, President Hu Jintao said recently, “is a test of our ability to control a complex situation, and also a test of our party’s governing ability.”

With this rapid downturn, the Chinese Communist Party suddenly looks vulnerable. Since Deng Xiaoping initiated economic reforms three decades ago, the party’s legitimacy has relied upon its ability to keep the economy running at breakneck pace. If China is no longer able to maintain a high growth rate or provide jobs for its ever growing labor force, massive public dissatisfaction and social unrest could erupt. No one realizes this possibility more than the handful of people who steer China’s massive economy. Double-digit growth has sheltered them through a SARS epidemic, massive earthquakes, and contamination scandals. Now, the crucial question is whether they are equipped to handle an economic crisis of this magnitude—and survive the political challenges it will bring.

#### Party instability causes nuclear lashout

Friedberg, Professor of Politics and International Affairs – Princeton, Asia Expert – CFR, ‘10

(Aaron, “Implications of the Financial Crisis for the US-China Rivalry,” *Survival*, Volume 52, Issue 4, August, p. 31 – 54)

Despite its magnitude, Beijing's stimulus programme was insufficient to forestall a sizeable spike in unemployment. The regime acknowledges that upwards of 20 million migrant workers lost their jobs in the first year of the crisis, with many returning to their villages, and 7m recent college graduates are reportedly on the streets in search of work.9 Not surprisingly, tough times have been accompanied by increased social turmoil. Even before the crisis hit, the number of so-called 'mass incidents' (such as riots or strikes) reported each year in China had been rising. Perhaps because it feared that the steep upward trend might be unnerving to foreign investors, Beijing stopped publishing aggregate, national statistics in 2005.10 Nevertheless, there is ample, if fragmentary, evidence that things got worse as the economy slowed. In Beijing, for example, salary cuts, layoffs, factory closures and the failure of business owners to pay back wages resulted in an almost 100% increase in the number of labour disputes brought before the courts.11 Since the early days of the current crisis, the regime has clearly been bracing itself for trouble. Thus, at the start of 2009, an official news-agency story candidly warned Chinese readers that the country was, 'without a doubt … entering a peak period of mass incidents'.12 In anticipation of an expected increase in unrest, the regime for the first time summoned all 3,080 county-level police chiefs to the capital to learn the latest riot-control tactics, and over 200 intermediate and lower-level judges were also called in for special training.13 Beijing's stimulus was insufficient At least for the moment, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appears to be weathering the storm. But if in the next several years the economy slumps again or simply fails to return to its previous pace, Beijing's troubles will mount. The regime probably has enough repressive capacity to cope with a good deal more turbulence than it has thus far encountered, but a protracted crisis could eventually pose a challenge to the solidarity of the party's leadership and thus to its continued grip on political power. Sinologist Minxin Pei points out that the greatest danger to CCP rule comes not from below but from above. Rising societal discontent 'might be sufficient to tempt some members of the elite to exploit the situation to their own political advantage' using 'populist appeals to weaken their rivals and, in the process, open[ing] up divisions within the party's seemingly unified upper ranks'.14 If this happens, all bets will be off and a very wide range of outcomes, from a democratic transition to a bloody civil war, will suddenly become plausible. Precisely because it is aware of this danger, the regime has been very careful to keep whatever differences exist over how to deal with the current crisis within bounds and out of view. If there are significant rifts they could become apparent in the run-up to the pending change in leadership scheduled for 2012. Short of causing the regime to unravel, a sustained economic crisis could induce it to abandon its current, cautious policy of avoiding conflict with other countries while patiently accumulating all the elements of 'comprehensive national power'. If they believe that their backs are to the wall, China's leaders might even be tempted to lash out, perhaps provoking a confrontation with a foreign power in the hopes of rallying domestic support and deflecting public attention from their day-to-day troubles. Beijing might also choose to implement a policy of 'military Keynesianism', further accelerating its already ambitious plans for military construction in the hopes of pumping up aggregate demand and resuscitating a sagging domestic economy.15 In sum, despite its impressive initial performance, Beijing is by no means on solid ground. The reverberations from the 2008-09 financial crisis may yet shake the regime to its foundations, and could induce it to behave in unexpected, and perhaps unexpectedly aggressive, ways.

## Off

#### The affirmatives strategy of development is rooted in racist assumptions of the “developing world”---economic engagement with Mexico is always predicated on the Western agenda

Grosfoguel 2K (Ramon, Associate Professor of Ethnic Studies at the University of California Berkeley, “Developmentalism, Modernity, and Dependency Theory in Latin America”, Nepantla: Views from South, Vol. 1 Iss. 2, p. 347-374)

Developmentalism became a global ideology of the capitalist world-economy. In the Latin American periphery these ideas were appropriated in the late eighteenth century by the Spanish Creole elites, who adapted them to their own agenda. Since most of the elites were linked to, or part of, the agrarian landowner class, which produced goods through coerced forms of labor to sell for a profit in the world market, they were very eclectic in their selection of which Enlightenment ideas they wished to utilize. Free trade and national sovereignty were ideas they defended as part of their struggle against the Spanish colonial monopoly of trade. However, for racial and class reasons, the modern ideas about individual freedom, rights of man, and equality were underplayed. There were no major social transformations of Latin American societies after the inde- pendence revolutions of the first half of the nineteenth century. The Creole elites left untouched the colonial noncapitalist forms of coerced labor as well as the racial/ethnic hierarchies. White Creole elites maintained after independence a racial hierarchy where Indians, blacks, mestizos, mulattoes and other racially oppressed groups were located at the bottom. This is what Aníbal Quijano (1993) calls “coloniality of power.” During the nineteenth century, Great Britain had become the new core power and the new model of civilization. The Latin American Creole elites established a discursive opposition between Spain’s “backwardness, obscurantism and feudalism” and Great Britain’s “advanced, civilized and modern” nation. Leopoldo Zea, paraphrasing José Enrique Rodó, called this the new “northernmania” (nordomanía), that is, the attempt by Creole elites to see new “models” in the North that would stimulate develop- ment while in turn developing new forms of colonialism (Zea 1986, 16–17). The subsequent nineteenth-century characterization by the Creole elites of Latin America as “feudal” or in a backward “stage” served to justify Latin American subordination to the new masters from the North and is part of what I call “feudalmania,” which would continue throughout the twentieth century. Feudalmania was a device of “temporal distancing” (Fabian 1983) to produce a knowledge that denied coevalness between Latin America and the so-called advanced European countries. The denial of coevalness created a double ideological mechanism. First, it concealed European responsibil- ity in the exploitation of the Latin American periphery. By not sharing the same historical time and existing in different geographical spaces, each region’s destiny was conceived as unrelated to each other region’s. Second, living different temporalities, where Europe was said to be at a more advanced stage of development than Latin America, reproduced a notion of European superiority. Thus Europe was the “model” to imitate and the developmentalist goal was to “catch up.” This is expressed in the dichotomy civilization/barbarism seen in figures such as Domingo Faustino Sarmiento in Argentina. The use of both neomercantilist and liberal economic ideas enabled the nineteenth-century Iberoamerican elites to oscillate between protectionist and free-trade positions depending on the fluctuations of the world economy. When they were benefiting from producing agrarian or mining exports in the international division of labor dominated at the time by British imperialism, liberal economic theories provided them with the rational justification for their role and goals. But when foreign competition or a world economic crisis was affecting their exports to the world market, they shifted production toward the internal markets and employed neomercantilist arguments to justify protectionist policies. In Chile, Argentina, and Mexico there were neomercantilist and economic nationalist arguments that anticipated many of the arguments developed one hundred years later by the Prebisch-CEPAL school1 and by some of the dependentis- tas (Potasch 1959; Frank 1970; Chiaramonte 1971). For example, the 1870s developmentalist debate was the most important economic debate in Ar- gentina during the nineteenth century and one of the most important in Latin America. An industrial development plan using protectionist neomercantilist policies was proposed. This movement was led by a profes- sor of political economy at the University of Buenos Aires and member of the Cámara de Diputados, Vicente F. López. López’s group was supported by the agrarian landowners, artisans, peasants, and incipient industrial cap- italists. Although all of them were protectionists, not all were economic nationalists. The protectionist position of the agrarian landowners was due to the 1866 and 1873 world economic crises, which had negatively affected export prices on wool, Argentina’s major export item at the time. Thus López promoted the development of a national cloth industry as a tran- sitional solution to the world depression. The movement ended once the wool producers shifted to cattle raising and meat exports. However, the group of deputies led by López developed neomer- cantilist and economic nationalist arguments that anticipated many of the arguments developed one hundred years later by the Prebisch-CEPAL school and by some of the dependentistas. Influenced by the late 1830s Argen- tinean romantic generation (e.g., Juan Bautista Alberdi, Esteban Echevar- ria), López defended a historicist/idiographic approach against the univer- salism of liberal political economists (Chiaramonte 1971, 128–29, 133–34). According to López, the idea of free trade is not an absolute principle; rather, its application depends on the particular conditions of each coun- try. If free trade was beneficial for the industrial development of foreign countries, in the Argentinean case, where different industrial and eco- nomic structures were present, free trade was not a solution. In the first phase of industrial development, industries need protection from foreign competition. As one of the protectionist group members, Lucio V. López, said in 1873, “It is a mistake to believe that political economy offers and contains inmutable principles for all nations” (Chiaramonte 1971, 129–30). This critique of the nomothetic/universalist approach of core state intellec- tuals is even stronger in the thesis of one of Vicente F. López’s disciples, Aditardo Heredia, who attacked European intellectuals’ social conceptions as ahistorical and metaphysical. Heredia criticized in particular the Eu- ropean Enlightenment thinkers for aspiring to develop a social science guided by universal and inflexible principles, similar to geometric theorems or algebraic formulas, without attention to the peculiar historical condi- tions of each nation (130). Carlos Pellegrini, one of the leading protectionist deputies, said as early as 1853 that Adam Smith’s beautiful deductions did not pay enough attention to an aspect that influences all human institutions: time (133). The debate was a classical nomothetic-idiographic confronta- tion. The Argentinean scholars opposed a theory based on a concept of an eternal time/space with more particularistic and historicist arguments. The originality of their arguments was to articulate an economic policy in support of a nationalist industrialization project in the periphery of the world economy and to identify relations with England as part of the source of Argentina’s underdevelopment. The economic nationalism of Vicente F. López and his group offered a critique of the dependent relations of Argentina with England and other European centers as early as the 1870s (Chiaramonte 1971, 192–93). Regarding this point, we can quote the following statements made by this protectionist group, which can show some similarities with certain CEPAL-dependentista positions one hundred years later: It is very beautiful...to speak of free trade...this word freedom . . . is so beautiful! But we must understand freedom. For the English who favor free trade, freedom is to allow English factories to manufacture the foreign products, to allow the English merchant to sell the foreign product. This type of freedom transforms the rest of the world into tributary countries; while England is the only nation that enjoys freedom, the remainder are tributary nations; but I do not understand free trade in this manner. By free trade I understand an exchange of finished goods for finished goods. The day our wool can be exported not in the form of a raw material, but rather as a finished frock coat in exchange for England’s iron needles or clock strings, then I would accept free trade, that is, a fin- ished product from our country for a finished product from England. But if free trade consists of sending our wool . . . so England may wash it (when I speak of England I also mean Eu- rope and the rest of the world), manufacture it, and sell it to us through English merchants, brought on English ships and sold by English agents, I do not understand; this is not free trade, this is making a country that does not possess this industry a tributary country. Thus, let’s follow the path of protectionism, given that if we see the history of the manufacturing countries, we will find that their progress is due to protectionism. (Speech by Finance Minister Rufino Varela in the legislature in 1876; cited in Chiaramonte 1971, 182–83) In the English Parliament, one of the illustrious defenders of free trade said that he would like, upholding his doctrine, to make of England the factory of the world and of America the farm of England. He said something very true . . . that to a great extent has been realized, because in effect we are and will be for a long time, if we do not solve this problem, the farm of the great manufacturing nations. (Speech by Carlos Pellegrini at the Cámara de Diputados in 1875; 189) It is impossible to be independent when a country is not self- sufficient, when it does not have all it needs to consume. . . . I know well what the remedies are: they are to have capital to pay ourselves for the elaboration of products and their adaptation for consumption. Only in this way would the country have independence and credit and be saved through its own efforts. (Speech by Vicente F. López at the Cámara de Diputados in 1875; 27) It has been recognized that political independence cannot exist without industrial and mercantile independence. (Speech by a protectionist deputy in 1874; 192) (It is not necessary) to be permanently dependent on foreign capital. . . . I am completely opposed to the establishment of companies with foreign capital. (Deputy Seeber in 1877; 185) Although this nationalist group was questioning the tenets of tra- ditional liberal political economy and the location of Argentina within the world division of labor (Chiaramonte 1971, 193), it is important to indicate that they were committed to a nationalist liberalism. They de- fended protectionism as a transitory, although necessary, stage to direct the country toward economic liberalism. They criticized the supporters of the free-market doctrine because this policy maintained the subordination of Argentina to England. They wished to restrict momentarily the full im- plementation of economic liberalism as a means of achieving it later: The newborn industries needed protection, but once they grew, free markets should be encouraged (191). This doctrine is very close to those of the Ger- man political economist Frederich List and the North American Casey, who also promoted protectionism against England as a necessary develop- mental stage. However, although their names were mentioned several times during the 1870s parliamentary debate (135), the dominant influence upon the Argentinian protectionists in the 1870s came from their own intellec- tual tradition (134–35). In sum, they were commited to national capitalist development through the formation of a local industrial bourgeoisie. Other countries in Latin America, such as Mexico (Potasch 1959) and Chile (Frank 1970) had similar debates during the nineteenth century. Probably the most extreme case in terms of the free-trade and protectionist debates was nineteenth-century Paraguay, where a protectionist regime led by Dr. Francia and the López family was destroyed by a military inter- vention of Brazil, Uruguay, and Argentina, aided by the British, to install a free-trade regime. Six out of seven Paraguayan males were killed in the Triple Alliance War. This war was a turning point for the triumph of the free-trade doctrine, which dominated in Latin America during the nineteenth century, the period of British hegemony. Agrarian and mining capitalists profited from selling raw materials or crops to, and buying man- ufactured products from, the British, rather than attempting to compete with them through industrialization. By the end of the nineteenth century, Spencerian evolutionism and Comtian scientism joined forces to form the Latin American version of positivism, which provided the ideological justification for both the economic subordination to the “empire of free trade” and the political domination of the dictatorships of “order and progress.” Scientism, progress, truth, property, evolutionary stagism, and order were all Enlightenment themes reproduced in Auguste Comte’s positivist and Herbert Spencer’s evolution- ary doctrines. They were both used in the Latin American periphery to justify the penetration of foreign capital investments and to promote economic liberalism against “backwardness” and “feudalism.” Evolutionary stagism, inevitable progress, and optimism in science and technology combined to form a teleological view of human history that strengthened the basis of developmentalist ideology. As a result of the U.S. military invasions in the region, the Mexican revolution in 1910, and the disillusionment with liberalism during the First World War, a new wave of nationalism emerged among Latin American elites. Once again, after the First World War, there was a radical questioning of economic liberalism, this time focused against the new hegemon in the region, the United States of America.

#### This fixation on Western development turns the case, destroys the environment, and breeds global self-hatred---the alternative is to reject their framing of the world---change must begin in our minds and the way we think about countries

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The concept of development is everywhere, in our personal lives and in the lives of communities and countries in general. We all believe that we need development. If we do not strive to develop, we get pressured in one way or another to do so. Other people try to force development on us. In talking about countries, people use the concept of developed countries, developing countries or underdeveloped countries. Accordingly, countries such as the USA, Britain, Sweden, Germany, and Japan are considered developed. However, countries such as Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda are considered developing or underdeveloped. These concepts are firmly entrenched in people’s minds. Do we know what we are talking about, when we use these concepts? Do these concepts make sense? Although I used to think like other people--that there are communities or countries that are developed and others that are developing or underdeveloped--I have discovered that these concepts are faulty and unreasonable. I dare say that these concepts confirm the existence of false consciousness in our heads, the product of faulty education. Why do I say this? First, saying that a certain community or country is developed implies that that community or country has reached the peak and is now static. The truth is that there is no community or country in the world that is static. Every society and every country is changing all the time, in different areas and respects: economic, political, cultural and so on. Even those societies or countries considered developed are changing all the time. The USA of three years ago is different from the USA of today, and the USA of five years to come will be different from that of today. Technological changes, for example, occur all the time. The same happens in other fields, such as culture and education. All countries follow that pattern. Changes never end, whether in Tanzania, England, or the USA. If this process of change means development, then every country in the world is a developing country. Therefore, the idea of there being countries that are developed and others that are developing does not make good sense. It is pointless to place some countries in the category of developed countries while they are, like the other countries, changing all the time. The fundamental issue, however, is the concept of development. We need to ask ourselves: what is development, and who defines it? Who sets the criteria for development?

On the whole, some countries, especially those which ruled us during colonialism--the powerful countries in the present world--are the ones which set the standards of development. Because Europe brags that it is developed, Africans and others around the world accept that notion and look at their own countries as developing or underdeveloped countries. These are neo-colonial ideas, an opium that was spread, and continues to be spread, in schools, the media, and many other institutions. We have to free ourselves mentally, so we can think for ourselves, instead of being parrots. We should have sound heads, which we can use for thinking about these issues ourselves. We have to build such an intellectual foundation, so we can reflect on the concept of development and ask ourselves what development is. In doing so, we ought to ask ourselves whether we have to accept the European concept of development. In thinking about development, we have to assume the duty and obligation of establishing our own criteria and using them. We should build the will to trust in ourselves and make our own decisions for our benefit. Without doing this, we will continue being parrots. Whatever they do in Europe or the USA, whatever exists in Europe or the USA, or whatever comes from there, we will see as development. The way things are, we believe completely that imitating the people of Europe or the USA constitutes development. If they initiate something, we want to imitate it. Our criteria for education, good governance, democracy, and so on are set by them. We have become perpetual followers. In the meantime, the people of Europe and the USA do not see anything of ours as development. It is only when we imitate their things that we get counted as developing. Even if we start anything, they do not see it as development. And we ourselves, looking at Europe and USA, don’t believe that what we do is development. If the thing had started in Europe or USA, we would have seen it as development. Even if something has no meaning, or has negative effects, as long as it is from Europe or the USA, people in our countries see it as development. Even if the things go against humanity, as long as they have come from Europe, our people see them as development. I can offer an example. Countries that are called developed have managed to build big cities, factories and different kinds of infrastructure, thereby appearing developed. Though there is considerable destruction of the environment in this development, the idea that these countries are developed remains intact, and we struggle to imitate them. We toil relentlessly to follow the same path they took, of destroying the environment through building factories and infrastructure. We do not care that what we call development has ruined and continues to ruin the environment. We want factories, without considering the effects on the water we use, the air we breathe, and the environment in general. We do not care that the development of Europe and the USA has destroyed social relationships creating debilitating alienation in people’s lives. Is this development? As I have stated, there is no country that is static, not changing. The mistake we make is not paying attention to this truth and, instead, looking at the countries of Europe and America as developed. Slavishly following everything European or American, we will remain forever in self-contempt, looking at ourselves as developing countries or undeveloped countries. With this perspective, we will never be on the same level as the countries we call developed. As long as we regard ourselves as being backward, we will remain backward. We will remain trapped in the belief that we are developing countries or underdeveloped countries. The people of Europe and America will continue to see what they do as development, and they will continue to push us along the path they see as development. We will continue to be always followers. There are, already, many so called development programs in our country and institutions from outside working on initiatives called development programs. Are we sure that these are not perpetuating the problem I am highlighting? We have an obligation to liberate ourselves mentally and establish our own standards. Without such standards, which would take into account the right of every people in the world to contribute to the formulation of the concept and criteria of development, it is not right to continue talking about developed countries and developing or underdeveloped countries. We have to change our thinking; we should reject the existing tradition of being called or calling ourselves developing countries, a tradition that reflect mental dependency, the mind of parrots, neo-colonialism. The effects of this dependency complex are evident everywhere. When we talk about the economic system, for example, we find ourselves struggling to imitate the reality of Europe and America. When we talk about education, the same applies. We struggle to follow the standards of Europe and America. Today, in our country, if someone starts a school and calls it Cambridge Academy, and another person starts one and calls it Lindi Academy, people will be attracted to the Cambridge Academy, without any thinking. When we talk about beauty, for example, it is the same thing. We follow European and American standards.

## Ex-Im

### Warming

#### No impact to warming---consensus

Taylor 12 (James, Forbes energy and environment writer, 3/14/2012, "Shock Poll: Meteorologists Are Global Warming Skeptics", www.forbes.com/sites/jamestaylor/2012/03/14/shock-poll-meteorologists-are-global-warming-skeptics/)

A recent survey of American Meteorological Society members shows meteorologists are skeptical that humans are causing a global warming crisis. The survey confirms what many scientists have been reporting for years; the politically focused bureaucratic leadership of many science organizations is severely out of touch with the scientists themselves regarding global warming issues. According to American Meteorological Society (AMS) data, 89% of AMS meteorologists believe global warming is happening, but only a minority (30%) is very worried about global warming. This sharp contrast between the large majority of meteorologists who believe global warming is happening and the modest minority who are nevertheless very worried about it is consistent with other scientist surveys. This contrast exposes global warming alarmists who assert that 97% of the world’s scientists agree humans are causing a global warming crisis simply because these scientists believe global warming is occurring. However, as this and other scientist surveys show, believing that some warming is occurring is not the same as believing humans are causing a worrisome crisis. Other questions solidified the meteorologists’ skepticism about humans creating a global warming crisis. For example, among those meteorologists who believe global warming is happening, only a modest majority (59%) believe humans are the primary cause. More importantly, only 38% of respondents who believe global warming is occurring say it will be very harmful during the next 100 years. With substantially fewer than half of meteorologists very worried about global warming or expecting substantial harm during the next 100 years, one has to wonder why environmental activist groups are sowing the seeds of global warming panic. Does anyone really expect our economy to be powered 100 years from now by the same energy sources we use today? Why immediately, severely, and permanently punish our economy with costly global warming restrictions when technological advances and the free market will likely address any such global warming concerns much more efficiently, economically and effectively? In another line of survey questions, 53% of respondents believe there is conflict among AMS members regarding the topic of global warming. Only 33% believe there is no conflict. Another 15% were not sure. These results provide strong refutation to the assertion that “the debate is over.” Interestingly, only 26% of respondents said the conflict among AMS members is unproductive. Overall, the survey of AMS scientists paints a very different picture than the official AMS Information Statement on Climate Change. Drafted by the AMS bureaucracy, the Information Statement leaves readers with the impression that AMS meteorologists have few doubts about humans creating a global warming crisis. The Information Statement indicates quite strongly that humans are the primary driver of global temperatures and the consequences are and will continue to be quite severe. Compare the bureaucracy’s Information Statement with the survey results of the AMS scientists themselves. Scientists who have attended the Heartland Institute’s annual International Conference on Climate Change report the same disconnect throughout their various science organizations; only a minority of scientists believes humans are causing a global warming crisis, yet the non-scientist bureaucracies publish position statements that contradict what the scientists themselves believe. Few, if any, of these organizations actually poll their members before publishing a position statement. Within this context of few actual scientist surveys, the AMS survey results are very powerful.

### Leadership

#### No modeling

Loris 13 (An economist specializing in energy and environmental issues, Nicolas Loris is the Heritage Foundation’s Herbert and Joyce Morgan Fellow., 1/30/2013, "No 'Following the Leader' on Climate Change", www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2013/1/no-following-the-leader-on-climate-change)

In his second inaugural address, President Obama pledged that the United States “will respond to the threat of climate change” and will take the lead for other countries to follow suit. This commitment is a willful rejection of reality. Congress has been unwilling to address climate change unilaterally through legislation. Multilateral attempts become more futile each year as major players, especially developing nations such as China and India, refuse to play ball. And why should they? Developing nations are not going to curb economic growth to solve a theoretical problem when their citizens face far more pressing environmental problems — especially when so many are trapped in grinding poverty and lack access to reliable electricity. This leaves the president with only one option for making good on his pledge: impose costly regulatory actions. This approach would be as pointless as unilateral legislative action. Why? Even accepting as fact the theory that Earth is warming and that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions are a warming agent does not make any of the following true: &bull; Man-made emissions are driving climate change and are a negative externality that needs to be internalized. Greenhouse gas emissions are a warming agent. But that fact doesn’t begin to settle the scientific debate about climate change and climate sensitivity — the amount of warming projected from increased greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, viewing man-made carbon dioxide as a strictly negative externality ignores a lot of peer-reviewed literature that identifies many positive effects (e.g., plant growth, human longevity, seed enrichment and less soil erosion as a result of more robust tree root growth) associated with higher levels of CO2 in the atmosphere. • Earth is cooking at a catastrophic rate. The media breathlessly reported that a recent National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s study found 2012 to be the warmest on record for the continental United States. What they largely failed to report was that, globally, 2012 was only the ninth-warmest in the past 34 years. In fact, average global temperatures have leveled off over the past decade and a half. • Sea levels will rise dramatically, threatening America’s coastlines. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change report, the bible of CO2-reduction proponents, projects sea levels rising 7 inches to 23 inches over the next century. That’s not as alarming as it sounds. Sea level has risen at the lower end of that projection over the past two centuries. • There will be more extreme droughts, heat waves, hurricanes and other natural disasters. Natural disasters (they’re called “natural” for a reason, right?) will occur with or without increased man-made emissions. Having failed repeatedly to win legislation limiting greenhouse gas emissions, the Obama administration appears bent on taking the regulatory route. The Environmental Protection Agency is promulgating stringent emission standards for new power plants that would effectively prohibit construction of coal-fired generators and prematurely shut down existing plants. The EPA also has introduced costly new air-quality standards for hydraulically fractured wells and new fuel-efficiency standards that will make cars and light-duty trucks more expensive, smaller and less safe. Restricting greenhouse gas emissions, whether unilaterally or multilaterally, will impose huge costs on consumers and the U.S. economy as a whole. Congress should exercise its seldom-used muscles as regulatory watchdog to keep regulatory proposals that are not cost-effective from full implementation and reverse the administration’s course on regulating CO2. As for the president’s suggestion that unilateral action by the U.S. will somehow inspire other countries to emulate our example — the repeated failure of U.N. negotiations to produce multilateral climate action demonstrates a near universal disinclination to sacrifice economic growth on the altar of global warming. President Obama should respond to the threat of climate change by acknowledging that the severity of the threat is low and the costs of action are painfully high. And that unilateral action by the United States won’t make a dent in Earth’s temperature anyway.

### Multilat

#### Multilat doesn’t solve warming

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Despite the dramatic rise of international environmental policymaking, recent developments suggest that environmental multilateralism is entering a period of crisis. As the latest Global% Environment% Outlook report of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) reveals, **multilateral environmental policy has failed to reverse, or even slow down, some of the most threatening environmental trends such as global warming and biodiversity loss.** Environmental campaigners and diplomats may have succeeded in establishing the environment on the international agenda and negotiating a plethora of environmental treaties, but whether international instruments make a difference on the ground remains far from clear. Moreover, the process of international environmental policySmaking has slowed down in recent years. Environmental multilateralism itself is being held back by global power struggles and a general sense of treaty fatigue. A loss of political momentum has been evident for some time in the climate change negotiations, which have failed to deliver a new treaty that could succeed the Kyoto Protocol. This was again noticeable at the recent 3 ‘Rio+20’ UN summit, which fell well below the aspirations and achievements of the original Rio ‘Earth Summit’ of 1992.

### Russia-China counter-balancing

#### No Russia--China alliance---geography

Zeihan 8 (Peter Zeihan, Stratfor, 2008. “China and Russia’s Geographic Divide,” http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/china\_and\_russia\_s\_geographic\_divide)

China and Russia are anything but natural partners. While their economic interests may seem complementary, geography dictates that their actual connections will be sharply limited. Moreover, in their roles of resource provider versus producer, they actually have a commercial relationship analogous to that of Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries versus the United States — with all the angst and distrust that suggests. Strategically, the two tend to swim in different pools, but they still share a borderland. Borderlands — where one great state flows into another — are dangerous places, as their precise locations ebb and flow with the geopolitical tides. And the only thing more likely to generate borderland friction than when one side is strong and the other weak is when both sides are strong. Currently, both China and Russia are becoming more powerful simultaneously, creating ample likelihood that the two will slide toward confrontation in regions of overlapping interest.

## Mexico

### Mexican Econ

**No Mexican econ collapse**

**Couch, 2012** (Neil, Brigadier, British Army, July 2012, “Mexico in Danger of Rapid Collapse’: Reality or Exaggeration?,” http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/rcds/publications/seaford-house-papers/2012-seaford-house-papers/SHP-2012-Couch.pdf)

A ‘collapsed’ state, however, as postulated in the Pentagon JOE paper, suggests ‘a total vacuum of authority’, the state having become a ‘mere geographical expression’.16 **Such an extreme hypothesis of Mexico disappearing like those earlier European states seems** implausible for a country that currently has the world’s 14th largest economy and higher predicted growth than either the UK, Germany or the USA; that has no external threat from aggressive neighbours, which was the ‘one constant’ in the European experience according to Tilly; and does not suffer the ‘disharmony between communities’ that Rotberg says is a feature common amongst failed states.17,18 A review of the literature does not reveal why the JOE paper might have suggested criminal gangs and drug cartels as direct causes leading to state collapse. Crime and corruption tend to be described not as causes but as symptoms demonstrating failure. For example, a study for Defense Research and Development Canada attempting to build a predictive model for proximates of state failure barely mentions either.19 One of the principal scholars on the subject, Rotberg, says that in failed states, ‘corruption flourishes’ and ‘gangs and criminal syndicates assume control of the streets’, but again as effect rather than trigger.20 The Fund for Peace Failed States Index, does not use either of them as a ‘headline’ indicator, though both are used as contributory factors. This absence may reflect an assessment that **numerous states suffer high levels of organised crime and corruption and nevertheless do not fail**. Mandel describes the corruption and extreme violence of the Chinese Triads, Italian Mafia, Japanese Yakuza and the Russian Mob that, in some cases, has continued for centuries.21 Yet none of these countries were singled out as potential collapsed or failed states in the Pentagon’s paper. Indeed, thousands of Americans were killed in gang warfare during Prohibition and many people ‘knew or at least suspected that politicians, judges, lawyers, bankers and business concerns collected many millions of dollars from frauds, bribes and various forms of extortion’.22 Organised crime and corruption were the norm in the political, business, and judicial systems and police forces ran their own ‘rackets’ rather than enforcing the law.23 **Neither the violence nor the corruption led to state failure**.

### Asian Wars

#### No risk of Asia war – Peaceful China and multilateral institutions

Bitzinger 9

[Richard, Senior Fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Barry, Dean of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies and Director of the Institute of Defense and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, “ Why East Asian War is Unlikely,” Survival | vol. 50 no. 6 | December 2008–January 2009

 The Asia-Pacific region can be regarded as a zone of both relative insecurity and strategic stability. It contains some of the world’s most significant flashpoints – the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, the Siachen Glacier – where tensions between nations could escalate to the point of major war. It is replete with unresolved border issues; is a breeding ground for transnational terrorism and the site of many terrorist activities (the Bali bombings, the Manila superferry bombing); and contains overlapping claims for maritime territories (the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands) with considerable actual or potential wealth in resources such as oil, gas and fisheries. Finally, the Asia-Pacific is an area of strategic significance with many key sea lines of communication and important chokepoints. Yet despite all these potential crucibles of conflict, the Asia-Pacific, if not an area of serenity and calm, is certainly more stable than one might expect. To be sure, there are separatist movements and internal struggles, particularly with insurgencies, as in Thailand, the Philippines and Tibet. Since the resolution of the East Timor crisis, however, the region has been relatively free of open armed warfare. Separatism remains a challenge, but the break-up of states is unlikely. Terrorism is a nuisance, but its impact is contained. The North Korean nuclear issue, while not fully resolved, is at least moving toward a conclusion with the likely denuclearisation of the peninsula. Tensions between China and Taiwan, while always just beneath the surface, seem unlikely to erupt in open conflict any time soon, especially given recent Kuomintang Party victories in Taiwan and efforts by Taiwan and China to re-open informal channels of consultation as well as institutional relationships between organisations responsible for cross-strait relations. And while in Asia there is no strong supranational political entity like the European Union, there are many multilateral organisations and international initiatives dedicated to enhancing peace and stability, including the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. In Southeast Asia, countries are united in a common geopolitical and economic organisation – the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which is dedicated to peaceful economic, social and cultural development, and to the promotion of regional peace and stability. ASEAN has played a key role in conceiving and establishing broader regional institutions such as the East Asian Summit, ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and South Korea) and the ASEAN Regional Forum. All this suggests that war in Asia – while not inconceivable – is unlikely. This is not to say that the region will not undergo significant changes. The rise of China constitutes perhaps the most significant challenge to regional security and stability – and, from Washington’s vantage point, to American hegemony in the Asia-Pacific. The United States increasingly sees China as its key peer challenger in Asia: China was singled out in the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review as having, among the ‘major and emerging powers … the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States’.1 Although the United States has been the hegemon in the Asia-Pacific since the end of the Second World War, it will probably not remain so over the next 25 years. A rising China will present a critical foreign-policy challenge, in some ways more difficult than that posed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War.2 While the Soviet Union was a political and strategic competitor, China will be a formidable political, strategic and economic competitor. This development will lead to profound changes in the strategic environment of the Asia-Pacific. Still, the rise of China does not automatically mean that conflict is more likely; the emergence of a more assertive China does not mean a more aggressive China. While Beijing is increasingly prone to push its own agenda, defend its interests, engage in more nationalistic – even chauvinistic – behaviour (witness the Olympic torch counter-protests), and seek to displace the United States as the regional hegemon, this does not necessarily translate into an expansionist or warlike China. If anything, Beijing appears content to press its claims peacefully (if forcefully) through existing avenues and institutions of international relations, particularly by co-opting these to meet its own purposes. This ‘soft power’ process can be described as an emerging ‘Beijing Consensus’ in regional international affairs. Moreover, when the Chinese military build-up is examined closely, it is clear that the country’s war machine, while certainly worth taking seriously, is not quite as threatening as some might argue.

### Nuke terror

#### No risk of nuclear terror

**Mueller 10** (John, professor of political science at Ohio State, Calming Our Nuclear Jitters, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, <http://www.issues.org/26.2/mueller.html>)

Politicians of all stripes preach to an anxious, appreciative, and very numerous choir when they, like President Obama, proclaim atomic terrorism to be “the most immediate and extreme threat to global security.” It is the problem that, according to Defense Secretary Robert Gates, currently keeps every senior leader awake at night. This is hardly a new anxiety. In 1946, atomic bomb maker J. Robert Oppenheimer ominously warned that if three or four men could smuggle in units for an atomic bomb, they could blow up New York. This was an early expression of a pattern of dramatic risk inflation that has persisted throughout the nuclear age. In fact, although expanding fires and fallout might increase the effective destructive radius, the blast of a Hiroshima-size device would “blow up” about 1% of the city’s area—a tragedy, of course, but not the same as one 100 times greater. In the early 1970s, nuclear physicist Theodore Taylor proclaimed the atomic terrorist problem to be “immediate,” explaining at length “how comparatively easy it would be to steal nuclear material and step by step make it into a bomb.” At the time he thought it was already too late to “prevent the making of a few bombs, here and there, now and then,” or “in another ten or fifteen years, it will be too late.” Three decades after Taylor, we continue to wait for terrorists to carry out their “easy” task. In contrast to these predictions, terrorist groups seem to have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. This may be because, after brief exploration of the possible routes, they, unlike generations of alarmists, have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely likely to be successful. The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money-transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, “have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates.” If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland‘s Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task “could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group.” They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is “exceptionally difficult to machine” whereas “plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed.“ Stressing the “daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues,” Younger concludes, “to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies” could fabricate a bomb “is farfetched at best.” Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is “not impossible.” But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes vanishingly small. Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists’ favor—for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles—the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion. Other routes would-be terrorists might take to acquire a bomb are even more problematic. They are unlikely to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad because the risk would be high, even for a country led by extremists, that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve, including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence. The terrorist group might also seek to steal or illicitly purchase a “loose nuke“ somewhere. However, it seems probable that none exist. All governments have an intense interest in controlling any weapons on their territory because of fears that they might become the primary target. Moreover, as technology has developed, finished bombs have been out-fitted with devices that trigger a non-nuclear explosion that destroys the bomb if it is tampered with. And there are other security techniques: Bombs can be kept disassembled with the component parts stored in separate high-security vaults, and a process can be set up in which two people and multiple codes are required not only to use the bomb but to store, maintain, and deploy it. As Younger points out, “only a few people in the world have the knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a nuclear weapon.” There could be dangers in the chaos that would emerge if a nuclear state were to utterly collapse; Pakistan is frequently cited in this context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, even under such conditions, nuclear weapons would probably remain under heavy guard by people who know that a purloined bomb might be used in their own territory. They would still have locks and, in the case of Pakistan, the weapons would be disassembled. The al Qaeda factor The degree to which al Qaeda, the only terrorist group that seems to want to target the United States, has pursued or even has much interest in a nuclear weapon may have been exaggerated. The 9/11 Commission stated that “al Qaeda has tried to acquire or make nuclear weapons for at least ten years,” but the only substantial evidence it supplies comes from an episode that is supposed to have taken place about 1993 in Sudan, when al Qaeda members may have sought to purchase some uranium that turned out to be bogus. Information about this supposed venture apparently comes entirely from Jamal al Fadl, who defected from al Qaeda in 1996 after being caught stealing $110,000 from the organization. Others, including the man who allegedly purchased the uranium, assert that although there were various other scams taking place at the time that may have served as grist for Fadl, the uranium episode never happened. As a key indication of al Qaeda’s desire to obtain atomic weapons, many have focused on a set of conversations in Afghanistan in August 2001 that two Pakistani nuclear scientists reportedly had with Osama bin Laden and three other al Qaeda officials. Pakistani intelligence officers characterize the discussions as “academic” in nature. It seems that the discussion was wide-ranging and rudimentary and that the scientists provided no material or specific plans. Moreover, the scientists probably were incapable of providing truly helpful information because their expertise was not in bomb design but in the processing of fissile material, which is almost certainly beyond the capacities of a nonstate group. Kalid Sheikh Mohammed, the apparent planner of the 9/11 attacks, reportedly says that al Qaeda’s bomb efforts never went beyond searching the Internet. After the fall of the Taliban in 2001, technical experts from the CIA and the Department of Energy examined documents and other information that were uncovered by intelligence agencies and the media in Afghanistan. They uncovered no credible information that al Qaeda had obtained fissile material or acquired a nuclear weapon. Moreover, they found no evidence of any radioactive material suitable for weapons. They did uncover, however, a “nuclear-related” document discussing “openly available concepts about the nuclear fuel cycle and some weapons-related issues.” Just a day or two before al Qaeda was to flee from Afghanistan in 2001, bin Laden supposedly told a Pakistani journalist, “If the United States uses chemical or nuclear weapons against us, we might respond with chemical and nuclear weapons. We possess these weapons as a deterrent.” Given the military pressure that they were then under and taking into account the evidence of the primitive or more probably nonexistent nature of al Qaeda’s nuclear program, the reported assertions, although unsettling, appear at best to be a desperate bluff. Bin Laden has made statements about nuclear weapons a few other times. Some of these pronouncements can be seen to be threatening, but they are rather coy and indirect, indicating perhaps something of an interest, but not acknowledging a capability. And as terrorism specialist Louise Richardson observes, “Statements claiming a right to possess nuclear weapons have been misinterpreted as expressing a determination to use them. This in turn has fed the exaggeration of the threat we face.” Norwegian researcher Anne Stenersen concluded after an exhaustive study of available materials that, although “it is likely that al Qaeda central has considered the option of using non-conventional weapons,” there is “little evidence that such ideas ever developed into actual plans, or that they were given any kind of priority at the expense of more traditional types of terrorist attacks.” She also notes that information on an al Qaeda computer left behind in Afghanistan in 2001 indicates that only $2,000 to $4,000 was earmarked for weapons of mass destruction research and that the money was mainly for very crude work on chemical weapons. Today, the key portions of al Qaeda central may well total only a few hundred people, apparently assisting the Taliban’s distinctly separate, far larger, and very troublesome insurgency in Afghanistan. Beyond this tiny band, there are thousands of sympathizers and would-be jihadists spread around the globe. They mainly connect in Internet chat rooms, engage in radicalizing conversations, and variously dare each other to actually do something. Any “threat,” particularly to the West, appears, then, principally to derive from self-selected people, often isolated from each other, who fantasize about performing dire deeds. From time to time some of these people, or ones closer to al Qaeda central, actually manage to do some harm. And occasionally, they may even be able to pull off something large, such as 9/11. But in most cases, their capacities and schemes, or alleged schemes, seem to be far less dangerous than initial press reports vividly, even hysterically, suggest. Most important for present purposes, however, is that any notion that al Qaeda has the capacity to acquire nuclear weapons, even if it wanted to, looks farfetched in the extreme. It is also noteworthy that, although there have been plenty of terrorist attacks in the world since 2001, all have relied on conventional destructive methods. For the most part, terrorists seem to be heeding the advice found in a memo on an al Qaeda laptop seized in Pakistan in 2004: “Make use of that which is available … rather than waste valuable time becoming despondent over that which is not within your reach.” In fact, history consistently demonstrates that terrorists prefer weapons that they know and understand, not new, exotic ones. Glenn Carle, a 23-year CIA veteran and once its deputy intelligence officer for transnational threats, warns, “We must not take fright at the specter our leaders have exaggerated. In fact, we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed, and miserable opponents that they are.” al Qaeda, he says, has only a handful of individuals capable of planning, organizing, and leading a terrorist organization, and although the group has threatened attacks with nuclear weapons, “its capabilities are far inferior to its desires.” Policy alternatives The purpose here has not been to argue that policies designed to inconvenience the atomic terrorist are necessarily unneeded or unwise. Rather, in contrast with the many who insist that atomic terrorism under current conditions is rather likely— indeed, exceedingly likely—to come about, I have contended that it is hugely unlikely. However, it is important to consider not only the likelihood that an event will take place, but also its consequences. Therefore, one must be concerned about catastrophic events even if their probability is small, and efforts to reduce that likelihood even further may well be justified. At some point, however, probabilities become so low that, even for catastrophic events, it may make sense to ignore them or at least put them on the back burner; in short, the risk becomes acceptable. For example, the British could at any time attack the United States with their submarine-launched missiles and kill millions of Americans, far more than even the most monumentally gifted and lucky terrorist group. Yet the risk that this potential calamity might take place evokes little concern; essentially it is an acceptable risk. Meanwhile, Russia, with whom the United States has a rather strained relationship, could at any time do vastly more damage with its nuclear weapons, a fully imaginable calamity that is substantially ignored. In constructing what he calls “a case for fear,” Cass Sunstein, a scholar and current Obama administration official, has pointed out that if there is a yearly probability of 1 in 100,000 that terrorists could launch a nuclear or massive biological attack, the risk would cumulate to 1 in 10,000 over 10 years and to 1 in 5,000 over 20. These odds, he suggests, are “not the most comforting.” Comfort, of course, lies in the viscera of those to be comforted, and, as he suggests, many would probably have difficulty settling down with odds like that. But there must be some point at which the concerns even of these people would ease. Just perhaps it is at one of the levels suggested above: one in a million or one in three billion per attempt.

## Agriculture

#### Food shortage doesn’t cause war – best studies

Allouche, research Fellow – water supply and sanitation @ Institute for Development Studies, frmr professor – MIT, ‘11

(Jeremy, “The sustainability and resilience of global water and food systems: Political analysis of the interplay between security, resource scarcity, political systems and global trade,” Food Policy, Vol. 36 Supplement 1, p. S3-S8, January)

The question of resource scarcity has led to many debates on whether scarcity (whether of food or water) will lead to conflict and war. The underlining reasoning behind most of these discourses over food and water wars comes from the Malthusian belief that there is an imbalance between the economic availability of natural resources and population growth since while food production grows linearly, population increases exponentially. Following this reasoning, neo-Malthusians claim that finite natural resources place a strict limit on the growth of human population and aggregate consumption; if these limits are exceeded, social breakdown, conflict and wars result. Nonetheless, it seems that most empirical studies do not support any of these neo-Malthusian arguments. Technological change and greater inputs of capital have dramatically increased labour productivity in agriculture. More generally, the neo-Malthusian view has suffered because during the last two centuries humankind has breached many resource barriers that seemed unchallengeable.

Lessons from history: alarmist scenarios, resource wars and international relations

In a so-called age of uncertainty, a number of alarmist scenarios have linked the increasing use of water resources and food insecurity with wars. The idea of water wars (perhaps more than food wars) is a dominant discourse in the media (see for example Smith, 2009), NGOs (International Alert, 2007) and within international organizations (UNEP, 2007). In 2007, UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon declared that ‘water scarcity threatens economic and social gains and is a potent fuel for wars and conflict’ (Lewis, 2007). Of course, this type of discourse has an instrumental purpose; security and conflict are here used for raising water/food as key policy priorities at the international level.

In the Middle East, presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers have also used this bellicose rhetoric. Boutrous Boutros-Gali said; ‘the next war in the Middle East will be over water, not politics’ (Boutros Boutros-Gali in Butts, 1997, p. 65). The question is not whether the sharing of transboundary water sparks political tension and alarmist declaration, but rather to what extent water has been a principal factor in international conflicts. The evidence seems quite weak. Whether by president Sadat in Egypt or King Hussein in Jordan, none of these declarations have been followed up by military action.

The governance of transboundary water has gained increased attention these last decades. This has a direct impact on the global food system as water allocation agreements determine the amount of water that can used for irrigated agriculture. The likelihood of conflicts over water is an important parameter to consider in assessing the stability, sustainability and resilience of global food systems.

None of the various and extensive databases on the causes of war show water as a casus belli. Using the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) data set and supplementary data from the University of Alabama on water conflicts, Hewitt, Wolf and Hammer found only seven disputes where water seems to have been at least a partial cause for conflict (Wolf, 1998, p. 251). In fact, about 80% of the incidents relating to water were limited purely to governmental rhetoric intended for the electorate (Otchet, 2001, p. 18).

As shown in The Basins At Risk (BAR) water event database, more than two-thirds of over 1800 water-related ‘events’ fall on the ‘cooperative’ scale (Yoffe et al., 2003). Indeed, if one takes into account a much longer period, the following figures clearly demonstrate this argument. According to studies by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), organized political bodies signed between the year 805 and 1984 more than 3600 water-related treaties, and approximately 300 treaties dealing with water management or allocations in international basins have been negotiated since 1945 (FAO, 1978 and FAO, 1984).

The fear around water wars have been driven by a Malthusian outlook which equates scarcity with violence, conflict and war. There is however no direct correlation between water scarcity and transboundary conflict. Most specialists now tend to agree that the major issue is not scarcity per se but rather the allocation of water resources between the different riparian states (see for example Allouche, 2005, Allouche, 2007 and [Rouyer, 2000] ). Water rich countries have been involved in a number of disputes with other relatively water rich countries (see for example India/Pakistan or Brazil/Argentina). The perception of each state’s estimated water needs really constitutes the core issue in transboundary water relations. Indeed, whether this scarcity exists or not in reality, perceptions of the amount of available water shapes people’s attitude towards the environment (Ohlsson, 1999). In fact, some water experts have argued that scarcity drives the process of co-operation among riparians (Dinar and Dinar, 2005 and Brochmann and Gleditsch, 2006).

In terms of international relations, the threat of water wars due to increasing scarcity does not make much sense in the light of the recent historical record. Overall, the water war rationale expects conflict to occur over water, and appears to suggest that violence is a viable means of securing national water supplies, an argument which is highly contestable.

The debates over the likely impacts of climate change have again popularised the idea of water wars. The argument runs that climate change will precipitate worsening ecological conditions contributing to resource scarcities, social breakdown, institutional failure, mass migrations and in turn cause greater political instability and conflict (Brauch, 2002 and Pervis and Busby, 2004). In a report for the US Department of Defense, Schwartz and Randall (2003) speculate about the consequences of a worst-case climate change scenario arguing that water shortages will lead to aggressive wars (Schwartz and Randall, 2003, p. 15). Despite growing concern that climate change will lead to instability and violent conflict, the evidence base to substantiate the connections is thin ( [Barnett and Adger, 2007] and Kevane and Gray, 2008).

#### Alt causes to food shocks---

#### First, warming

Damian **Carrington 11**, head environment reporter at the Guardian, “Food prices driven up by global warming, study shows”, May 5, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/may/05/food-prices-global-warming>

Global warming has already harmed the world's food production and has driven up food prices by as much as 20% over recent decades, new research has revealed. The drop in the productivity of crop plants around the world was not caused by changes in rainfall but was because higher temperatures can cause dehydration, prevent pollination and lead to slowed photosynthesis. Lester Brown, president of the Earth Policy Institute, Washington DC, said the findings indicate a turning point: "Agriculture as it exists today evolved over 11,000 years of reasonably stable climate, but that climate system is no more." Adaptation is difficult because our knowledge of the future is not strong enough to drive new investments, he said, "so we just keep going, hoping for the best." The scientists say their work shows how crucial it is to find ways to adapt farming to a warmer world, to ensure that rises in global population are matched by rising food production. "It is vital," said Wolfram Schlenker, at Columbia University in New York and one of the research team. "If we continue to have the same seed varieties and temperatures continue to rise, then food prices will rise further. [Addressing] that is the big question." The new research joins a small number of studies in which the fingerprint of climate change has been separated from natural variations in weather and other factors, demonstrating that the effects of warming have already been felt in the world. Scientists have shown that the chance of the severe heatwave that killed thousands in Europe in 2003 was made twice as likely by global warming, while other work showed that the floods that caused £3.5bn of damage in England in 2000 were made two to three times more likely.

#### And weather

Tim **Schooley 11**, Pittsburgh Business Times, “Oil prices, bad weather send food prices skyward”, May 6, <http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/print-edition/2011/05/06/oil-prices-weather-food-proces-skyward.html>

Along with fast-rising fuel prices, weather-induced crop shortfalls also are affecting food prices. Those in the food and restaurant industries say they haven’t seen the kind of business challenges they are now since the gas price spike and credit crisis of 2008. “I don’t think the weather instability has ever been as hostile in the last 100 years as it was in the last 12 months,” wrote Jeremy Grantham, chief investment officer of GMO Capital, an investment management firm, in a recent report. “If you were to read a one-paragraph summary of almost any agricultural commodity, you would see weather listed as one of the causes of the price rising.” The U.S. Department of AgriculturebizWatch U.S. Department of Agriculture Latest from The Business Journals Federal aid available for fire-damaged homes, communitiesHare Wynn secures 0M settlement in rice caseTwo DeKalb DFCS workers guilty of fraud Follow this company projects rising prices for a host of food commodities: Beef, up 6 percent to 8 percent; pork, up 7.5 percent. Corn prices have doubled since last year, and wheat prices remain at near record highs.

#### And, meat consumption

Damian **Carrington 11**, head environment reporter at the Guardian, “Food prices driven up by global warming, study shows”, May 5, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/may/05/food-prices-global-warming>

Food prices have reached new record highs this year, and have been implicated as a trigger for unrest in the Middle East and Africa. A rising appetite for meat is a critical factor, said Wolfram. "We actually have enough calories to feed the world quite comfortably, the problem is meat is really inefficient," as many kilogrammes of grain are needed to produce one kilogramme of meat, he said. "As countries get richer and have a preference for meat, which is more expensive, they price people in poorer countries out of the market."

#### Environment

VOA, 1/17/11

[Voice of America, “World Food Prices Expected to Stay High or Keep Rising,” <http://www.voanews.com/learningenglish/home/agriculture/Economists-Express-Concern-about-World-Food-Prices-113880179.html>]

Economists across the world are expressing concern about rising food prices. The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization recently released its Food Price Index. The list showed that a number of foods cost more than during the world food crisis of two thousand eight. The index is at its highest level since it began in nineteen ninety. Demonstrations and deadly food riots have broken out this month, as they did in two thousand eight. The FAO predicts that world market prices for rice, wheat, barley, sugar and meat will stay high or continue rising. One reason for this is the threat of shortages caused by bad weather. Current and recent weather disasters have harmed agriculture and affected prices in several parts of the world. For example, the current flooding in Australia has done great damage to crops in the usually fertile Queensland area. Chickpea, wheat, sorghum and corn are among the crops affected. Floods also have harmed other vegetables and fruits. Local agricultural producers report that standing water could destroy up to half of next year’s sugar crop. And economists say prices for the fruits and vegetables could likely increase over the next six months. The effects on prices from floods last year in Pakistan and China are still being felt. Last week, Russia extended an earlier ban on wheat exports. Russia acted after heat, drought and wildfires destroyed about a third of its wheat crop last summer. The ban was placed to make sure Russians have enough wheat. The first ban caused worldwide wheat prices to climb last year by almost fifty percent.

# 2NC

## Overview

**Their depiction of anarchy in the international system without the plan is racist---it describes the developing world as “chaos” and creates an us/them dichotomy**

**Henderson ‘7**  (Errol A., assoc. prof. poli sci at Penn St., “Navigating the Muddy Waters of the Mainstream: Tracing the Mystification of Racism in International Relations,” African American Perspectives on Political Science, ed. by Wilbur C. Rich, p. 326-30)

One of the key idealists of the twentieth century, who is also regarded as one of the progenitors of the field of international relations, was a former professor, Woodrow Wilson, who became President of the United Siates on the eve of World War 1. Confronting the issue of the United States’ involvement in what was then called the Great War, Wilson articulated and at the war’s end attempted to institutionalize these idealist premises in the postwar order established at Vers ailles in 1919. Some analysts, such as Ray argue that “Wilson can be seen as the founder of idealism and, in a way, as the founder of the field itself’ (1995, 7). But the view that Wilson established the scholarly field of International Relations is more accepted wisdom than actual fact; it actually obfuscates less salutary but more significant factors that contributed to the emergence of world politics. Clearly, IR at its birth was concerned with anarchy and power; however, this anarchy was largely assumed to result from the lack of cohesion in the primitive polities of the inferior races—especially those in the tropical domains of what we would now consider the third world. At the same time, the power that was wielded by the “civilized” white races through their “modem” states and the mechanism of “efficient” and “rational” colonial administration could insure that “anarchy” did not spread to the modern world and contribute to violence among the major(white) powers**.** These notions, while informed to some extent by Woodrow Wilson’s (1887) work, emerged more directly from such scholars of world politics as Paul Reinsch, whose World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century (1900) is considered the first work in the intellectual field of world politics. Reinsch’s Colonial Government (1902) and Colonial Administration (1905) placed him among the leading experts on colonial administration. Olson and Groom (1991, 47) note that Reinsch’s work “suggests that the discipline of international relations had its real beginnings in studies of imperialism, not in world order, as has so often been suggested.” Reinsch (1900, 14) argued that the emergent force of “national imperialism” was transforming the landscape of international relations as European states sought “to control as large a portion of the earth’s surface as their energy and opportunities will permit.” For him, national imperialism was the attempt “to increase the resources of the national state through the absorption or exploitation of undeveloped regions and inferior races” without attempting to “impose political control upon highly civilized nations.” Reinsch attempted to reconcile the interests of colonizer and colonized in his conceptualization of effective colonial administration, which led him to criticize United States policy in the Philippines following the Spanish-American War. Reinsch, however, also justified expansion in the name of the “white man’s burden” (Schmidt 1998, 72). Some scholars, such as Philip Kerr in his An Introduction to the Study of international Relations (1916), argued that “one of the most fundamental facts in human history” is that “mankind is divided into a graduated scale” ranging from the civilized to the barbarian, which necessitated colonization of the latter by the former (163). Still others, such as Giddings, invoked “survival of the fittest” logic to rationalize the subjugation or “governing” of “the inferior races of mankind” as the duty of the civilized. These scholars drew on Kidd’s The Control of the Tropics, which stated that the tropical regions were “existing [in] a state either of anarchy, or of primitive savagery. . . in which no attempt is made or can he made to develop the natural resources lying ready to hand” (1898, 15). For Kidd, the superior races had a responsibility to overcome the anarchy of the tropics so that the riches of the “third world” could be cultivated**.** The competition for these resources might engender conflict among the civilized states, as Hobson, Angell, Du Bois, Lippmann, and subsequently, Lenin, would more famously argue. It follows that world politics as a field of inquiry in political science emerges from the comparative study of colonial administration in the context of concerns with anarchy, power, and race. So the **discussions of anarchy** among both realists and idealists **are grounded in a discourse** concerned with the obligations of superior peoples to impose order on the anarchic domains **of “inferior peoples”** in order to prevent the **chaos** endemic in the tropics from **spilling over into the superior peoples’ territories**, possessions, or spheres of interest.Similarly**,** both realist and idealist concerns with power are grounded in a racist discourse concerned largely with the power of whites to subjugate the tropics and then put themselves in charge of the administration of the societies of the colonized“others.” Therefore, the roots of realism— the dominant paradigm in world politics—are grounded in a rationalization for constructing a hierarchical racial order to be imposed upon the anarchy alleged to arise from the “tropics,” an anarchy that begs for rational administration from whites. That is, realism is little more than an intellectual justification for **colonialism** and **imperialism** in the guise of the “white man’s burden.” In addition, the roots of idealism are found less in idealized versions of classical liberal precepts regarding the perfectibility of humanity; the primacy of “God-given” individual rights; and the institutionalization of democracy, free trade, and the rule of law(which in actuality were never intended for the nonwhite peoples of the world) than with the imposition of a racist order on indigenous peoples throughout Africa and Asia and the administration of that racist order for the benefit of white people. Thus realism and idealism have common roots in their shared racist conception of anarchy as a condition inherent in the societies of the “inferior races” and the corresponding necessity for whites to use power to impose “order” on the anarchical societies. This order would be imposed to prevent the anarchy from spilling over into the lands of the civilized whites and threatening their security.

#### Racism is a decision-rule---reject it in every instance

**Memmi 2K** (Albert, Professor Emeritus of Sociology @ U of Paris, Naiteire, Racism, Translated by Steve Martinot, p. 163-165)

The struggle against racism will be long, difficult, without intermission, without remission, probably never achieved. Yet, for this very reason, it is a struggle to be undertaken **without** surcease and without **concessions**. One cannot be indulgent toward racism; one **must not** even **let the monster in the house, especially** **not in a mask**. To give it merely a foothold means to augment the bestial part in us and in other people, which is to diminish what is human. T**o accept the racist universe to the slightest degree is to endorse fear, injustice, and violence**. It is to accept the persistence of the dark history in which we still largely live. it is to agree that the outsider will always be a possible victim (and which man is not himself an outsider relative to someone else?. Racism illustrates, in sum, the inevitable negativity of the condition of the dominated that is, it illuminates in a certain sense the entire human condition. The anti-racist struggle, difficult though it is, and always in question, is nevertheless one of the prologues to the ultimate passage from animosity to humanity. In that sense, we cannot fail to rise to the racist challenge. However, it remains true that one’s moral conduit only emerges from a choice: one has to want it. **It is a choice** among other choices, and always debatable in its foundations and its consequences. Let us say, broadly speaking, that the choice to conduct oneself morally is the condition for the establishment of a human order, for which racism is the very negation. This is almost a redundancy. **One cannot found a moral order, let alone a legislative order, on racism, because racism signifies the exclusion of the other**, and his or her subjection to violence and domination. From an ethical point of view, if one can deploy a little religious language, racism is ‘the truly capital sin. It is not an accident that almost all of humanity’s spiritual traditions counsels respect for the weak, for orphans, widows, or strangers. It is not just a question of theoretical morality and disinterested commandments. Such unanimity in the safeguarding of the other suggests the real utility of such sentiments. All things considered, we have an interest in banishing injustice, because injustice engenders violence and death. Of course, this is debatable. There are those who think that if one is strong enough, the assault on and oppression of others is permissible. Bur no one is ever sure of remaining the strongest. One day, perhaps, the roles will be reversed. All unjust society contains within itself the seeds of its own death. It is probably smarter to treat others with respect so that they treat you with respect. “Recall.” says the Bible, “that you were once a stranger in Egypt,” which means both that you ought to respect the stranger because you were a stranger yourself and that you risk becoming one again someday. It is an ethical and a practical appeal—indeed, it is a contract, however implicit it might be. In short, the refusal of racism is the condition for all theoretical and practical morality because, in the end, **the ethical choice commands the political choice**, **a just society must be** a society **accepted by all**. If this contractual principle is not accepted, then only conflict, violence, and destruction will be our lot. If it is accepted, we can hope someday **to live in peace**. True, it is a wager, but the stakes are irresistible.

## Link---Aid---2NC

**International aid policies fall under the trap of the aid effect---hidden neoliberal frameworks corrupt the policy-making process and further violent development**

**Mosse ‘5** – (David - David Mosse is Professor of Social Anthropology and Head of the Department of Anthropology and Sociology. He studied social anthropology at Oxford University from where he received a DPhil. He has published extensively on the anthropology of religion, environment and development. He is a Fellow of the British Academy, and on the editorial boards of World Development, American Ethnologist and Journal of Development Studies. He has worked for Oxfam as Representative for South India, and for other international development agencies as a social development adviser; “GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL AID”; 2005; http://www.hapinternational.org/pool/files/global-governance-and-ethno-of-intl-aid-august-2006.pdf)

Today international development policy is characterised by the convergence of ideas of neoliberal reform, democratisation and poverty reduction **within a framework of ‘global governance’.** What insights into the social processes and effects of this new consensus on aid and global governance can anthropology give? This is a good moment to ask such a question. In recent years there has been a gradual expansion of the scope of ethnography from its classical concern with ‘the local’ and ‘the other’, or the impact of global processes on local places, to more sophisticated conceptions of local–global relations. Some of these examine the way in which global capitalism has to negotiate its presence in specific settings; some explore the ‘production of locality’ in the context of global processes (Appadurai 1997); and yet others focus on the production of globalisation in terms of the relationships and institutions through which ‘the global’ is articulated (Burawoy 2001).

**The aid effect** is a contribution to this ethnographic trajectory. Its chapters demonstrate the fruitfulness of an ethnographic approach to aid, policy reform and global governance. Together they provide powerful commentary on **hidden processes**, multiple perspectives or regional interests behind **official policy discourses**. The book raises important questions concerning the systematic social effects of aid relationships, the nature of sovereignty and the state, and the workings of power inequalities and biases built through the standardisations and efficiencies of a neoliberal framework. At the same time, a ‘global aid architecture’ presents new challenges to the anthropology of development. How are relationships (international, state–citizen) reconfigured in the contemporary transnational aid domain? Are boundaries between nation-states, donors and self-governing international financial institutions (such as the IMF and World Bank) blurred by the new technical demands of managing aid flows? Does the ‘moral resurrection of aid’ with its emphasis on ownership, participation and good governance in fact **conceal an era of greater intervention** by international agencies in the internal affairs of developing countries?

**The new architecture of aid guarantees the plan is turned into a contract rather than actual aid---it promises aid only after neoliberal reform---this fosters a culture of selective intervention that should be rejected**

**Mosse ‘5** – (David - David Mosse is Professor of Social Anthropology and Head of the Department of Anthropology and Sociology. He studied social anthropology at Oxford University from where he received a DPhil. He has published extensively on the anthropology of religion, environment and development. He is a Fellow of the British Academy, and on the editorial boards of World Development, American Ethnologist and Journal of Development Studies. He has worked for Oxfam as Representative for South India, and for other international development agencies as a social development adviser; “GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF INTERNATIONAL AID”; 2005; http://www.hapinternational.org/pool/files/global-governance-and-ethno-of-intl-aid-august-2006.pdf)

Much of this book focuses on what has sometimes been characterised as a **‘new architecture of aid’.** To what does this refer? First, it refers to the focus of aid on policy reform rather than conventional investment projects; reform which is ‘neoliberal’ in the sense of promoting economic liberalisation, privatisation and market mechanisms as the instruments of growth and efficiency. Instead of funding individual projects donors collaborate (in principle) to make concessional finance available (in the short term through budgetary support) to assist governments to develop their own overall strategies for economic growth and poverty reduction (through Comprehensive Development Frameworks, sector-wide approaches [SWAPs], and the like) or finance the cost of fiscal, governance or pro-poor reforms that would make these strategies sustainable in the long run (such as privatising loss-making public sector operations, cutting civil service, decentralisation and anti-corruption measures). In some cases loans and grants are now made to states on the basis of demonstrable commitment and past performance on the reform agenda – **that is aid ‘selectivity’** rather than ‘conditionality’ – and outcomes known through state-level poverty monitoring. This change in aid, Eyben (with León, this volume) suggests, can be regarded as **a shift from ‘gift’ to ‘contract’.**

## AT: Link Turn

#### Their neoliberal development strategy of partnerships with the poor occludes structural inequality, turns the case, and is unethical to the core

Arora and Romijin ‘12

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Recent business school writing on the Base of the Pyramid (BoP) makes the grand claim that **Trans-National Corporations** (TNCs) **can eradicate global poverty** by 2015. And they can reach this target while making a handsome profit, by selling their innovative products to the billions of poor around the world or by partnering with the latters as ‘**co-producers’**. Naturally, this **win-win** BoP **proposition** is posited as a genuine opportunity for firms to ‘do well by doing good’. The BoP proposition thus echoes and hopes to extend earlier efforts to help the poor using Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) schemes that also contribute to a ‘firm’s financial bottom line’ (Newell and Frynas, 2007: 670). Just like the rhetoric of CSR has attempted to provide ‘social’ legitimacy to further corporate accumulation and expropriation, the latest BoP discourse has sidelined **decades’ worth** of controversial experience with the role of private business in development (Banerjee, 2007; Prieto-Carrón et al, 2006; also see Madeley, 2008). Even in development agency circles (see for example, UNCPSD, 2004; and UNDP, 2008), this newfound role for private business in poverty eradication has gradually supplanted the view that large firms, in carrying out their ‘businessasusual’ activities, can actually exacerbate poverty e.g. through adverse incorporation of poor producers into global markets, dispossession of land for mineral resource extraction, and fuelling corruption (see Banerjee, 2000; McCarthy, 2010; Prieto-Carrón et al., 2006: 980). This convergence of corporate interest and current development thinking does not come as a surprise if one situates it in the historical shift toward neoliberalism unfolding in the last three decades. Under neoliberalism, poor country governments, often following advice provided by experts from the World Bank and other development agencies, have scaled back the state’s role as regulator of markets and its responsibility of securing essential services, such as healthcare, education, sanitation and water, for those in need. And with this, the burden of securing one’s livelihood and accessing essential services (by paying user fees) has been squarely placed on the shoulders of individual households. The faith in neoliberalism is undergirded by economic theory which positions deregulated markets as ‘**efficient’ and** thus **necessary** for generating economic growth which in turn leads to poverty reduction. This ‘economism forbids responsibility and mobilization **by cancelling out politics’** while giving ‘itself the **air** **of** a message of **liberation**, through a whole series of lexical tricks around the idea of freedom, liberation, deregulation etc’ (Bourdieu, 1998: 50). The BoP proposition is such a new ‘message of liberation’ and this time sent directly to the doors of the world’s poor—all they need to do to be liberated is consume (or co-produce) the fruits of the global market. However, like many other promises of utopia, the neoliberal **BoP proposition is** a discursive curtain **that hides** a world of **unequal power relations** in its folds **while ‘adding its own**—specifically symbolic—**force to those power relations’** (Bourdieu, 1998: 95). In this article, we criticize recent BoP literature for ‘cancelling out politics’ by obscuring unequal power relations at different societal levels and in the process, painting a rosy picture of winwin outcomes that will make (some of) the world’s richest corporations richer and simultaneously add a **few crucial pennies** to the pockets of the poor. We argue that precisely these local and global power relations, by shaping the practice of any BoP ventures on the ground, will determine their outcomes in terms of reduction of poverty (or, its exacerbation). Thus, while this article is positioned within a growing stream of literature critical of Prahalad’s and Hart’s original BoP ideas (e.g. Bendell, 2005; Jaiswal, 2007; Jenkins, 2005; Jose, 2006; Karnani, 2007), it goes further than these critiques by arguing that the current BoP discourse serves an important **ideological function for global capital**, specifically **producing a discursive depoliticization of its corporate interventions in the lives of the world’s poor.** Moreover, the BoP discourse is unethical in holding out **untested**, if not utterly false, **promises** while sidelining a **whole history** of political struggles that have marked many poor communities’ previous encounters with large corporations (see Banerjee, 2007 and Madeley, 2008 for some examples).

# CP

## AT: NK

#### North Korea isn’t a threat – just ignore them

Kaplan 12(Fred Kaplan, “Let’s Ignore North Korea,” 4/19/12) http://www.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2012/let\_s\_ignore\_north\_korea\_66647?utm\_source=feedburner&utm\_medium=feed&utm\_campaign=Feed%3A+NewAmerica+%28The+Latest+From+New+America%29&utm\_content=Google+Reader)

The North Koreans can be such a pain, so wearying, you wish that you could just ignore them. So let’s do that. Let’s ignore them. For the moment, it might be, strategically, the best thing we can do. Their latest escapade, which some analysts have since hyped as a threat and harbinger of crisis, was the attempt on April 13 to launch a missile into space. (Pyongyang’s foreign ministry insisted that the payload was merely a peaceful satellite, but this was a ruse and, in any case, irrelevant: A rocket that can spin a satellite into orbit can also release a nuclear warhead.) The launch, of course, was a dreadful, stupid thing. On Feb. 29, the Obama administration had signed an accord with the North Koreans, agreeing to provide them with 240,000 tons of food aid over the next year if they suspended all missile and nuclear tests – and here they were, violating the deal just six weeks later, which suggested that they’d been planning the launch while signing on the dotted line. But the headline is this: The missile sputtered and shattered into a million pieces a few seconds after blast off – the same ending that’s marked all their long-range missile tests. In response, Obama cut off the food aid and pushed a resolution through the U.N. Security Council denouncing the launch as a “serious violation” of international law. That was the proper response (though it was a tactical mistake for Obama to link food aid with an arms accord in the first place – food should be given as humanitarian assistance, not foisted as a political bargaining chip; a link to energy supplies would have been more fitting). Now what should we do? Shrug, and say “Well, we tried to give Li’l Kim a chance,” and walk away. Two days after the failed launch, as if to tack a sick-o punch line to a lame joke, Kim Jong-un, the Hermit Kingdom’s new 28-year-old pygmy tyrant, delivered a public speech boasting of North Korea’s “military superiority” and vowing not to succumb to imperialist pressure. This was typical rhetoric from the Kim dynasty – Il-sung, Jong-il, and now Jong-un, who often come off as the Borats of International Communism. What should we do about that speech and others like it? Nothing, except maybe giggle. Are the North Koreans a threat? Not to the United States, not remotely. They have enough plutonium to build at most a handful of nuclear weapons, though whether they’ve built them, nobody knows. They’ve conducted underground tests twice, one in 2006, the other in 2009. The explosive power in both instances ranked extremely slight in the annals of nuclear coming-out parties. There are signs that they’re preparing to test a uranium bomb. (The others were plutonium.) If they do, and if it’s a little bit more awesome than the earlier tests, the proper response, again, is … well, not quite to ignore it, but almost. One obstacle to silence on this score is that we have allies in the region. Specifically, South Korea and Japan can’t be expected to strike a cool pose in the shadow of Pyongyang’s bomb. Nor can the United States, their ultimate guarantor of security, sit back and whistle as if nothing had happened. Doing so might send a signal, to all concerned, that we accept North Korea’s status as a nuclear power. So, yes, the Obama administration should, again, issue the obligatory condemnation, draft a resolution for the U.N. Security Council, and ratchet up sanctions against Pyongyang’s regime. Just don’t expect this to result in much. But more to the point, don’t get bent out of shape. That would only play into their game. The North Korean leaders savor our attention. They grow a little in their own delusional stature every time we shudder over the grave danger they allegedly pose. They shine a little brighter in the domestic propaganda that touts them, and justifies their totalitarian rule, as the much-feared protectors of the Great Korean Nation. Scott Snyder, in his seminal book Negotiating on the Edge, describes North Korea’s diplomatic style as “a prolonged cycle of crisis, intimidation and brinksmanship.” The trick to countering it is to break the cycle, and one way to do that is not to get sucked into it. Instead of exaggerating their strength, we should solidify our own. Snyder notes the shrewd strategy pioneered by Kim Il-sung (North Korea’s founder and the current Kim’s grandfather) of behaving like a “shrimp among whales,” maximizing his leverage by playing the whales – the much larger, often hostile nations all around him – off one another. The best way to counter that strategy is to disarm it. Clasp close to South Korea and Japan. Appear, smiling, with their leaders at every opportunity. Sign accords of all sort, meaningful or otherwise. Hold the occasional joint military exercise. Let loose a head-spinning statistic now and then, on how much air, sea, and ground power we could amass on the Korean peninsula while barely lifting a finger. Don’t brandish any of this. Do it all casually. Float like a butterfly, and quietly, calmly, let the North Koreans know how painful our bee sting will be if they pull anything like the crazy mischief they often threaten to unleash.

# Ex-Im

## AT: Modeling

#### Their modeling internal link is wrong---Congress is unwilling to start a model and China would never cooperate because of economic pressure to produce---that’s Loris

#### Impossible to cut global emissions – no modeling or momentum

Mead 10 (Walter Russell, senior fellow for U.S. foreign policy at the Council on Foreign Relations, The Death of Global Warming, February 1, <http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2010/02/01/the-death-of-global-warming/>)

The global warming movement as we have known it is dead. Its health had been in steady decline during the last year as the once robust hopes for a strong and legally binding treaty to be agreed upon at the Copenhagen Summit faded away. By the time that summit opened, campaigners were reduced to hoping for a ‘politically binding’ agreement to be agreed that would set the stage for the rapid adoption of the legally binding treaty. After the failure of the summit to agree to even that much, the movement went into a rapid decline. The movement died from two causes: bad science and bad politics. After years in which global warming activists had lectured everyone about the overwhelming nature of the scientific evidence, it turned out that the most prestigious agencies in the global warming movement were breaking laws, hiding data, and making inflated, bogus claims resting on, in some cases, no scientific basis at all. This latest story in the London Times is yet another shocker; the IPCC’s claims that the rainforests were going to disappear as a result of global warming are as bogus and fraudulent as its claims that the Himalayan glaciers would melt by 2035. It seems as if a scare story could grab a headline, the IPCC simply didn’t care about whether it was reality-based. With this in mind, ‘climategate’ — the scandal over hacked emails by prominent climate scientists — looks sinister rather than just unsavory. The British government has concluded that University of East Anglia, home of the research institute that provides the global warming with much of its key data, had violated Britain’s Freedom of Information Act when scientists refused to hand over data so that critics could check their calculations and methods. Breaking the law to hide key pieces of data isn’t just ‘science as usual,’ as the global warming movement’s embattled defenders gamely tried to argue. A cover-up like that suggests that you indeed have something to conceal. The urge to make the data better than it was didn’t just come out of nowhere. The global warmists were trapped into the necessity of hyping the threat by their realization that the actual evidence they had — which, let me emphasize, all hype aside, is serious, troubling and establishes in my mind the need for intensive additional research and investigation, as well as some prudential steps that would reduce CO2 emissions by enhancing fuel use efficiency and promoting alternative energy sources — was not sufficient to get the world’s governments to do what they thought needed to be done. Hyping the threat increasingly doesn’t look like an accident: it looks like it was a conscious political strategy. Now it has failed. Not everything that has come out of the IPCC and the East Anglia Climate Unit is false, but enough of their product is sufficiently tainted that these institutions can best serve the cause of fighting climate change by stepping out of the picture. New leadership might help, but everything these two agencies have done will now have to be re-checked by independent and objective sources. The global warming campaigners got into this mess because they had a deeply flawed political strategy. They were never able to develop a pragmatic approach that could reach its goals in the context of the existing international system. The global warming movement proposed a complex set of international agreements involving vast transfers of funds, intrusive regulations in national economies, and substantial changes to the domestic political economies of most countries on the planet. As it happened, the movement never got to the first step — it never got the world’s countries to agree to the necessary set of treaties, transfers and policies that would constitute, at least on paper, a program for achieving its key goals. Even if that first step had been reached, the second and third would almost surely not have been. The United States Congress is unlikely to pass the kind of legislation these agreements would require before the midterm elections, much less ratify a treaty. (It takes 67 senate votes to ratify a treaty and only 60 to overcome a filibuster.) After the midterms, with the Democrats expected to lose seats in both houses, the chance of passage would be even more remote — especially as polls show that global warming ranks at or near the bottom of most voters’ priorities. American public opinion supports ‘doing something’ about global warming, but not very much; support for specific measures and sacrifices will erode rapidly as commentators from Fox News and other conservative outlets endlessly hammer away. Without a commitment from the United States to pay its share of the $100 billion plus per year that poor countries wanted as their price for compliance, and without US participation in other aspects of the proposed global approach, the intricate global deals fall apart. Since the United States was never very likely to accept these agreements and ratify these treaties, and is even less prepared to do so in a recession with the Democrats in retreat, even “success” in Copenhagen would not have brought the global warming movement the kind of victory it sought — although it would have created a very sticky and painful political problem for the United States. But even if somehow, miraculously, the United States and all the other countries involved not only accepted the agreements but ratified them and wrote domestic legislation to incorporate them into law, it is extremely unlikely that all this activity would achieve the desired result. Countries would cheat, either because they chose to do so or because their domestic systems are so weak, so corrupt or so both that they simply wouldn’t be able to comply. Governments in countries like China and India aren’t going to stop pushing for all the economic growth they can get by any means that will work — and even if central governments decided to move on global warming, state and local authorities have agendas of their own. The examples of blatant cheating would inevitably affect compliance in other countries; it would also very likely erode what would in any case be an extremely fragile consensus in rich countries to keep forking over hundreds of billions of dollars to poor countries — many of whom would not be in anything like full compliance with their commitments. For better or worse, the global political system isn’t capable of producing the kind of result the global warming activists want. It’s like asking a jellyfish to climb a flight of stairs; you can poke and prod all you want, you can cajole and you can threaten. But you are asking for something that you just can’t get — and at the end of the day, you won’t get it. The grieving friends and relatives aren’t ready to pull the plug; in a typical, whistling-past-the-graveyard comment, the BBC first acknowledges that even if the current promises are kept, temperatures will rise above the target level of two degrees Celsius — but let’s not despair! The BBC quotes one of its own reporters: “BBC environment reporter Matt McGrath says the accord lacks teeth and does not include any clear targets on cutting emissions. But if most countries at least signal what they intend to do to cut their emissions, it will mark the first time that the UN has a comprehensive written collection of promised actions, he says.”

#### China outweighs and won’t be influenced by the plan

Harvey, environment reporter – the Guardian, 11/9/’11

(Fiona, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/09/fossil-fuel-infrastructure-climate-change>)

Birol also warned that China – the world's biggest emitter – would have to take on a much greater role in combating climate change. For years, Chinese officials have argued that the country's emissions per capita were much lower than those of developed countries, it was not required to take such stringent action on emissions. But the IEA's analysis found that within about four years, China's per capita emissions were likely to exceed those of the EU.

In addition, by 2035 at the latest, China's cumulative emissions since 1900 are likely to exceed those of the EU, which will further weaken Beijing's argument that developed countries should take on more of the burden of emissions reduction as they carry more of the responsibility for past emissions.

In a recent interview with the Guardian recently, China's top climate change official, Xie Zhenhua, called on developing countries to take a greater part in the talks, while insisting that developed countries must sign up to a continuation of the Kyoto protocol – something only the European Union is willing to do. His words were greeted cautiously by other participants in the talks.

Continuing its gloomy outlook, the IEA report said: "There are few signs that the urgently needed change in direction in global energy trends is under way. Although the recovery in the world economy since 2009 has been uneven, and future economic prospects remain uncertain, global primary energy demand rebounded by a remarkable 5% in 2010, pushing CO2 emissions to a new high. Subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption of fossil fuels jumped to over $400bn (£250.7bn)."

Meanwhile, an "unacceptably high" number of people – about 1.3bn – still lack access to electricity. If people are to be lifted out of poverty, this must be solved – but providing people with renewable forms of energy generation is still expensive.

Charlie Kronick of Greenpeace said: "The decisions being made by politicians today risk passing a monumental carbon debt to the next generation, one for which they will pay a very heavy price. What's seriously lacking is a global plan and the political leverage to enact it. Governments have a chance to begin to turn this around when they meet in Durban later this month for the next round of global climate talks."

One close observer of the climate talks said the $400bn subsidies devoted to fossil fuels, uncovered by the IEA, were "staggering", and the way in which these subsidies distort the market presented a massive problem in encouraging the move to renewables. He added that Birol's comments, though urgent and timely, were unlikely to galvanise China and the US – the world's two biggest emittters – into action on the international stage.

"The US can't move (owing to Republican opposition) and there's no upside for China domestically in doing so. At least China is moving up the learning curve with its deployment of renewables, but it's doing so in parallel to the hugely damaging coal-fired assets that it is unlikely to ever want (to turn off in order to) to meet climate targets in years to come."

## Multilat Fails

#### Multilat fails to stop climate change---most recent evidence proves past coop has been over easy-issues but diverse interests crush climate coalitions---that’s Falkner

#### Multilat especially fails at climate change

Young et al 13

Kevin Young is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, David Held is Master of University College, and Professor of Politics and International Relations, at the University of Durham. He is also Director of Polity Press and General Editor of Global Policy, Thomas Hale is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University, Open Democracy, May 24, 2013, "Gridlock: the growing breakdown of global cooperation", http://www.opendemocracy.net/thomas-hale-david-held-kevin-young/gridlock-growing-breakdown-of-global-cooperation

Climate change

Gridlock exists across a range of different areas in global governance today, from security arrangements to trade and finance. This dynamic is, arguably, most evident in the realm of climate change. The diffusion of industrial production across the world—a process enabled by economic globalization—has created a situation in which the basic consumption of each individual directly affects the life chances of every other individual on the planet, as well as the life chances of future generations.

This is a powerful and entirely new form of global interdependence. Bluntly put, the future of our civilization depends on our ability to cooperate across borders. And yet, despite twenty years of multilateral negotiations under the UN, a global deal on climate change mitigation or adaptation remains elusive, with differences between developed countries, which have caused the problem, **and developing countries**, which will drive future emissions, forming the core barrier to progress. Unless we overcome gridlock in climate negotiations, as in other issue areas, we will be unable to continue to enjoy the peace and prosperity we have inherited from the postwar order.

There are, of course, several forces that might work against gridlock. These include the potential of social movements to uproot existing political constraints, catalysed by IT innovation and the use of associated technology for coordination across borders; the capacity of existing institutions to adapt and accommodate factors such as emerging multipolarity (the shift from the G-5/7 to the G-20 is one example); and efforts at institutional reform which seek to alter the organizational structure of global governance (for example, proposals to reform the Security Council or to establish a financial transaction tax).

Whether there is the political will or leadership to move beyond gridlock remains a pressing question. Social movements find it difficult to convert protests into consolidated institutional change. At the same time, the political leadership of the great power blocs appears dogged by national concerns: Washington is sharply divided, Europe is preoccupied with the future of the Euro and China is absorbed by the challenge of sustaining economic growth as the prime vehicle of domestic legitimacy. Against this background, the further deepening of gridlock and the continuing failure to address global collective action problems appears likely.

In the aftermath of the Second World War the institutional breakthroughs that occurred provided the momentum for decades of sustained economic growth and geopolitical stability sufficient for the transformation of the world economy, the shift from the Cold War to a multipolar order, and the rise of new communication and network societies.

However, what worked then does not work as well now, as gridlock freezes problem solving capacity in global governance. The search for a politics beyond gridlock, in theory and in practice, is a hugely significant task – nationally and globally – if global governance is to be once again both effective and fit for purpose.

#### No chance for international climate co-op

Mead 6/26/13

Walter Russell Mead, Professor of Foreign Affairs and the Humanities at Bard College, editor-at-large of The American Interest, The American Interest, June 26, 2013, " Checking in on the Global Climate Treaty: Yep, Still Dead", http://blogs.the-american-interest.com/wrm/2013/06/26/checking-in-on-the-global-climate-treaty-yep-still-dead/

Global greens would love to believe that the international community could give this another shot. But national-level progress from the world’s top two emitters doesn’t change the fact that a global treaty is still unworkable. We’ve seen over and over again, at conference after conference, how difficult it is to get countries on board with an international strategy. The gap between the developed and the developing world still looks unbridgeable. How can the developed world, responsible for most of the carbon dioxide currently in the atmosphere, tell the developing world, which now contributes 60 percent of the world’s emissions from energy, to curtail its growth for the sake of the planet? Even if, by some miracle, world leaders manage to divvy up who is responsible for what in a global climate treaty, without a credible enforcement mechanism it will amount to a green version of the Kellogg-Briand pact. Going back to the international drawing board is a waste of time. Instead of continuing this futile exercise, leaders should be building on this momentum to push through new policies at the national level, picking low-hanging fruit like energy efficiency and encouraging new ways of living and working (telework, anyone?) that can hasten the transition from an industrial to an information economy.

## Russia-China

#### No counter-balancing---although their arguments might sound persuasive, geography will always be a barrier to effective alliances---that’s Zeihan

#### It’s impossible---egos

Zeihan 8 (Peter Zeihan, Stratfor, 2008. “China and Russia’s Geographic Divide,” http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/china\_and\_russia\_s\_geographic\_divide)

There are still plenty of reasons to doubt the durability of this development. In terms of modern warfare, the islands are strategic irrelevancies, so their surrender is not exactly a huge gesture of trust. Achieving any semblance of economic integration between the two powers still would be more trouble and expensive than it would be worth, making any deepening of the bilateral relationship difficult. Russia’s demographic slide instills a perfectly logical paranoia in the Kremlin; Russians are outnumbered 7 to 1 by their “partner” in terms of population and 3 to 1 in terms of economic size — something that Russian pride will find far harder to accept than merely handing over some islands. There is no substitute to the American market for China. Period. Sharing Central Asia is simply impossible because both sides need the same resources to achieve and maintain their strategic aims. And neither power has a particularly sterling reputation when it comes to confidence building.

#### US-Russia relations outweigh

Weitz 11 (Richard, senior fellow at the Hudson Institute and a World Politics Review senior editor 9/27/2011, “Global Insights: Putin not a Game-Changer for U.S.-Russia Ties,” <http://www.scribd.com/doc/66579517/Global-Insights-Putin-not-a-Game-Changer-for-U-S-Russia-Ties>)

Fifth, there will inevitably be areas of conflict between Russia and the United States regardless of who is in the Kremlin. Putin and his entourage can never be happy with having NATO be Europe's most powerful security institution, since Moscow is not a member and cannot become one. Similarly, the Russians will always object to NATO's missile defense efforts since they can neither match them nor join them in any meaningful way. In the case of Iran, Russian officials genuinely perceive less of a threat from Tehran than do most Americans, and Russia has more to lose from a cessation of economic ties with Iran -- as well as from an Iranian-Western reconciliation. On the other hand, these conflicts can be managed, since they will likely remain limited and compartmentalized. Russia and the West do not have fundamentally conflicting vital interests of the kind countries would go to war over. And as the Cold War demonstrated, nuclear weapons are a great pacifier under such conditions. Another novel development is that Russia is much more integrated into the international economy and global society than the Soviet Union was, and Putin's popularity depends heavily on his economic track record. Beyond that, there are objective criteria, such as the smaller size of the Russian population and economy as well as the difficulty of controlling modern means of social communication, that will constrain whoever is in charge of Russia.

# Mexico

## Econ

#### Their economy won’t collapse---Couch evidence says its hyperbolic hypocrisy---their economy is thriving

#### Failed state discourse is methodologically flawed---reject it

Jones ‘8 (Branwen Gruffydd(2008) 'The global political economy of social crisis: Towards a critique of the 'failed state' ideology', Review of International Political Economy, 15: 2, 180 — 205 Lecturer in International Political Economy at the University of London, PhD)

The descriptive, ahistorical and atheoretical nature of the category of ‘failed state’ helps in the easy acceptance of this account of the nature and causes of social and political crisis in Somalia. The untheorized no- tion of the state assumed by the ‘failed state’ discourse is abstracted from the historical development of particular forms of state, and isolated from the economy and the social relations which constitute society. This rei- ﬁes the surface appearances of formal political institutions and functions, and falsely assumes the universality of distinct political forms speciﬁc to capitalist society; it also obliterates the historically speciﬁc character of imperial, colonial and neocolonial states. In confronting the challenge of explanatory critique, the very category of ‘failed state’ must be rejected. It is inseparable from underlying methodological ﬂaws which assume that which has to be explained – the histori- cally speciﬁc form of state–society relations. This is not to contest the exis- tence of profound social, political and economic crises in Africa and other regions, to which the term is so readily applied, but to challenge their char- acterization and, above all, their explanation, in terms of ‘state failure’. This point is illustrated clearly in the case of Somalia’s condition. The general account reproduced via the discourse of ‘state failure’ focuses on questions of individual leadership and pathology, and the inherent tendency towards clan-based division and conﬂict as a deﬁning feature of Somali culture. Be- cause what a state is meant to look like is assumed, the characterization of Somalia’s condition as ‘state failure’ does not actually address the historical speciﬁcity of Somalia’s state–society relations, but focuses instead on the behavior of abhorrent individuals, and aspects of Somali culture which are assumed to be inherent. In order to produce a more adequate understand- ing and explanation of the Somali crisis of the 1990s it is necessary to exam- ine the historical legacy of colonial rule on Somalia’s modern social forma- tion; the speciﬁc character of Somalia’s postcolonial political economy and its structured insertion into the regional and global capitalist system; and the overwhelming signiﬁcance of international intervention in Somalia and the region of the Horn of Africa over the four decades since independence.

## Asia War

#### No war in Asia – china is peaceful and multilateral institutions mean that wars can never escalate – that Bitzinger

#### Empirics

Washburn 3/10/13

Taylor, a lawyer studying Northeast Asia at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies, “a lawyer studying Northeast Asia at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.,” http://journal.georgetown.edu/2013/03/10/averting-asias-great-war-by-taylor-washburn/

In a recent Financial Times essay, “The Shadow of 1914 Falls Over the Pacific,” Gideon Rachman compares the current situation in East Asia to that in Europe a century ago. Like Germany in the early 20th century, China is a country on the rise, concerned that status quo powers will seek to block its ascent. In prewar Europe, a German military buildup and growing nationalism around the region helped create a dynamic in which the assassination of an obscure Austrian noble could trigger a devastating multinational war. The parallels with East Asia today are clear, Rachman says, and “the most obvious potential spark is the unresolved territorial dispute between Japan and China over the islands known as the Diaoyu to the Chinese and the Senkaku to the Japanese.” There is no denying the gravity of the danger posed by this row. Violent anti-Japanese riots erupted across China last fall after Japan’s government purchased the islands from a private owner, and Tokyo has recently claimed that a Chinese frigate locked its missile-guidance radar on a Japanese destroyer in the East China Sea. With ships and planes from both nations mingling in the vicinity of the islands, peace depends not only on the prudence of politicians in Beijing and Tokyo, but also the temperament and skill of a handful of sailors and pilots. The U.S.-Japan security treaty has played a pivotal role in ensuring Asia’s postwar stability, and will help deter Chinese aggression going forward, but as Rachman observes, the pact also recalls the alliance network that contributed to the expansion of World War I. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that major powers have often clashed without escalation. The example of 1914, in which a seemingly insignificant event forced all of Europe’s great military machines to shudder to life, is the exception rather than the rule. Since the bloody aftermath of their 1947 partition, India and Pakistan have skirmished repeatedly–and even engaged in several limited wars–without descending into full-scale conflict. In the 1960s, China fought with first India and then the Soviet Union over land, yet on neither occasion did combat spread beyond the frontier. Indeed, large interstate wars since World War I have not generally begun with a trigger akin to an assassination or a scuffle between forces on a remote perimeter, but rather with a major attack or colonial collapse.

#### Structural factors check escalation

Alagappa 8 (Muthia, Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center PhD, International Affairs, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 2008. “The Long Shadow,” p. 512)

International political interaction among Asian states is for the most part rule governed, predictable, and stable. The security order that has developed in Asia is largely of the instrumental type, with certain normative contractual features (Alagappa 2003b). It rests on several pillars. These include the consolidation of Asian countries as modern nation-states with rule-governed interactions, wide- spread acceptance of the territorial and political status quo (with the exception of certain boundary disputes and a few survival concerns that still linger), a regional normative structure that ensures survival of even weak states and supports inter- national coordination and cooperation, the high priority in Asian countries given to economic growth and development, the pursuit of that goal through partici- pation in regional and global capitalist economies, the declining salience of force in Asian international politics, the largely status quo orientation of Asia's major powers, and the key role of the United States and of regional institutions in pre- serving and enhancing security and stability in Asia.

## Nuke Terror

#### No nuke terror: takes too long, too high-risk, terrorist preferences, and empirics – Al Qaeda’s best efforts never moved past planning – that’s Mueller.

#### Statistic proves – aggregating the chances of success for each step puts the chance at one in a million, and that’s worst-case.

#### Terror-threat discourse is based in irrational fear sustained by corporate and government profit

Greenwald 12

(Glenn, JD in Constitutional Law and recipient of the first annual I.F. Stone Award for Independent Journalism and winner of the 2010 Online Journalism Association Award and author of three New York Times Bestselling books and named as one of the 25 most influential political commentators in the nation, “The sham “terrorism expert” industry” Aug 15, 2012, Salon)

Shortly prior to the start of the London Olympics, there was an outburst of hysteria over the failure to provide sufficient security against Terrorism, but as Harvard Professor Stephen Walt noted yesterday in Foreign Policy, this was all driven, as usual, by severe exaggerations of the threat: “Well, surprise, surprise. Not only was there no terrorist attack, the Games themselves came off rather well.” Walt then urges this lesson be learned:

 [W]e continue to over-react to the “terrorist threat.” Here I recommend you read John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart’s The Terrorism Delusion: America’s Overwrought Response to September 11, in the latest issue of International Security. Mueller and Stewart analyze 50 cases of supposed “Islamic terrorist plots” against the United States, and show how virtually all of the perpetrators were (in their words) “incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational and foolish.” They quote former Glenn Carle, former deputy national intelligence officer for transnational threats saying “we must see jihadists for the small, lethal, disjointed and miserable opponents that they are,” noting further that al Qaeda’s “capabilities are far inferior to its desires.”

In the next paragraph, Walt essentially makes clear why this lesson will not be learned: namely, because there are too many American interests vested in the perpetuation of this irrational fear:

 Mueller and Stewart estimate that expenditures on domestic homeland security (i.e., not counting the wars in Iraq or Afghanistan) have increased by more than $1 trillion since 9/11, even though the annual risk of dying in a domestic terrorist attack is about 1 in 3.5 million. Using conservative assumptions and conventional risk-assessment methodology, they estimate that for these expenditures to be cost-effective “they would have had to deter, prevent, foil or protect against 333 very large attacks that would otherwise have been successful every year.” Finally, they worry that this exaggerated sense of danger has now been “internalized”: even when politicians and “terrorism experts” aren’t hyping the danger, the public still sees the threat as large and imminent. As they conclude:

 … Americans seems to have internalized their anxiety about terrorism, and politicians and policymakers have come to believe that they can defy it only at their own peril. Concern about appearing to be soft on terrorism has replaced concern about seeming to be soft on communism, a phenomenon that lasted far longer than the dramatic that generated it … This extraordinarily exaggerated and essentially delusional response may prove to be perpetual.”

 Which is another way of saying that you should be prepared to keep standing in those pleasant and efficient TSA lines for the rest of your life, and to keep paying for far-flung foreign interventions designed to “root out” those nasty jihadis.

Many of the benefits from keeping Terrorism fear levels high are obvious. Private corporations suck up massive amounts of Homeland Security cash as long as that fear persists, while government officials in the National Security and Surveillance State can claim unlimited powers, and operate with unlimited secrecy and no accountability. In sum, the private and public entities that shape government policy and drive political discourse profit far too much in numerous ways to allow rational considerations of the Terror threat.

## AT: Pemex

Thriving---2ac answer doesn’t cut it=---that’s couch and the Economist

#### Pemex decline doesn’t collapse the economy

FT ‘13 (Financial Times, 2/1/13, “Pemex blast puts onus on energy reforms,” http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/eb947824-6c88-11e2-953f-00144feab49a.html#axzz2NSCSJswg)

While the Mexican stock market has hit record highs recently and the economy is forecast to grow more than 3.5 per cent in 2013, faster than Brazil for the third year in a row, output at Pemex has slumped. From a peak of 3.4m barrels of oil a day in 2004, production has fallen to about 2.6m bpd. Experts say that without greater foreign investment and technology Mexico could cease to be a major energy exporter within six years, even though it sits on promising deepwater reserves in the Gulf of Mexico. “So what will the Pemex explosion mean for the national debate on energy reform? It puts Pemex firmly in the spotlight for a start,” tweeted Duncan Wood, director of the Mexico Institute at the Woodrow Wilson centre in Washington. “Pemex needs to be modernised from top to bottom, from exploration and production to basic practices ... Will legislators [now] recognise that Pemex has fallen behind the times?” The contrast between Pemex and the rest of Mexico’s export sector is stark. While foreign car and electronic goods manufacturers have poured investment into the country, boosting national exports to a record, under the Mexican constitution Pemex is only allowed to offer limited service contracts with private companies.

# Ag

## No War

#### Best statistics prove food shocks don’t cause war---empirics in the Middle East prove---states are cooperative once they run out of food---that’s Allouche

#### Food shocks impact ev cited in the 2ac isn’t specific to bio-fuel induced shocks so it’s non-unique---the billion people impact is empirically denied---it’s also from CBS news so should be rejected

#### Zero risk of starvation

**Reichman 95** - Former senior editor at the Cato Institute (Sheldon “**The International Population Stabilization and Reproductive Health Act (S. 1029)”** <http://www.cato.org/testimony/ct-ps720.html>**)**

Food is abundant. Since 1948, according to the UN Food and Agriculture Organization and the U.S. Department of Agriculture, annual world food production has outpaced the increase in population. Today, per capita production and per-acre yields are at all-time highs. Prices of agricultural products have been falling for over 100 years. The average inflation-adjusted price of those products, indexed to wages, fell by more than 74 percent between 1950 and 1990. While Lester Brown of the Worldwatch Institute and the noted butterfly expert Paul Ehrlich predict higher food prices and increasing scarcity, food is becoming cheaper and more plentiful. That good news is due largely to technological advances (the "green revolution") that have provided better seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, and methods of farming.

#### No food scarcity

**Jalsevac 4** (Paul, Life site news a division of Interim Publishing, “The Inherent Racism of Population Control”, <http://www.lifesite.net/waronfamily/Population_Control/Inherentracism.pdf>)

The pattern continues today. Economist Dennis Avery explained in 1995 that, food production was more than keeping pace with population growth since the world had, “more than doubled world food output in the past 30 years. We have raised food supplies per person by 25 percent in the populous Third World.”4 The United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (UNFAO) also dispelled fears of shortages in the food supply when, in preparation for the World Food Summit in Rome in November of 1995 it reported that, “Globally food supplies have more than doubled in the last 40 years…at a global level, there is probably no obstacle to food production rising to meet demand.”5 The UNFAO also later estimated that, simply with the present available technologies fully employed, the world could feed 30 to 35 billion people, i.e. roughly six times the present world population.6 It also reported that the number of people considered malnourished has declined from 36 percent in 1961-1970 to 20 percent in 1988-90 and later proclaimed that “earlier fears of chronic food shortages over much of the world proved unfounded.”7 The World Bank joined in to predict in 1993 that the improvement in the world food supply would continue, while pointing out that in developing countries grain production has grown at a faster rate than population since 1985. Grain production has slowed in the United States, but that is because stocks have grown so large that additional production could not be stored.8 A further wealth of evidence is available to remove any concerns about resource shortage in the modern world.

# 1NR

## FW

#### **Subject formation is what we are trying to accomplish in debate on an everyday level, we form better subjects by attuning our ethical sensibilities to the violence of development---comparatively more effective than a hubristic fantasy that we can change the world**

Chandler, Professor of IR at Westminster, 13

(The World of Attachment? The Post-humanist Challenge to Freedom and Necessity, Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 41(3), 516– 534)

The world of becoming thereby is an ontologically flat world without the traditional hierarchies of existence and a more shared conception of agency. For Bennett, therefore, ‘to begin to experience the relationship between persons and other materialities more horizontally, is to take a step toward a more ecological sensibility’.78 Here there is room for human agency but this agency involves a deeper understanding of and receptivity to the world of objects and object relations. Rather than the hubristic focus on transforming the external world, the ethico-political tasks are those of work on the self to erase hubristic liberal traces of subject-centric understandings, understood to merely create the dangers of existential resentment. Work on the self is the only route to changing the world. As Connolly states: ‘To embrace without deep resentment a world of becoming is to work to “become who you are”, so that the word “become” now modifies “are” more than the other way around.’ Becoming who you are involves the ‘microtactics of the self’, and work on the self can then extend into ‘micropolitics’ of more conscious and reflective choices and decisions and lifestyle choices leading to potentially higher levels of ethical self-reflectivity and responsibility. Bennett argues that against the ‘narcissism’ of anthropomorphic understandings of domination of the external world, we need ‘some tactics for cultivating the experience of our selves as vibrant matter’. Rather than hubristically imagining that we can shape the world we live in, Bennett argues that: ‘Perhaps the ethical responsibility of an individual human now resides in one’s response to the assemblages in which one finds oneself participating. Such ethical tactics include reflecting more on our relationship to what we eat and considering the agentic powers of what we consume and enter into an assemblage with. In doing so, if ‘an image of inert matter helps animate our current practice of aggressively wasteful and planet-endangering consumption, then a materiality experienced as a lively force with agentic capacity could animate a more ecologically sustainable public’. For new materialists, the object to be changed or transformed is the human – the human mindset. By changing the way we think about the world and the way we relate to it by including broader, more non-human or inorganic matter in our considerations, we will have overcome our modernist ‘attachment disorders’ and have more ethically aware approaches to our planet. In cultivating these new ethical sensibilities, the human can be remade with a new self and a ‘new self-interest’.

#### Actualization is a neg argument—if their extinction scenarios are true, you don’t have the capacity to prevent them, but you can ethically align yourself against neoliberalism—that was cross-ex—that’s a reason to vote negative in and of itself

Morgareidge ‘98 (Clayton, Prof of Philosophy at Lewis & Clark College, Why Capitalism is Evil 08/22 <http://www.lclark.edu/~clayton/commentaries/evil.html>

Now none of these philosophers are naive: none of them thinks that sympathy, love, or caring determines all, or even most, human behavior. The 20th century proves otherwise. What they do offer, though, is the hope that human beings have the capacity to want the best for each other. So now we must ask, What forces are at work in our world to block or cripple the ethical response? This question, of course, brings me back to capitalism. But before I go there, I want to acknowledge that capitalism is not the only thing that blocks our ability to care. Exploitation and cruelty were around long before the economic system of capitalism came to be, and the temptation to use and abuse others will probably survive in any future society that might supersede capitalism. Nevertheless, I want to claim, the putting the world at the disposal of those with capital has done more **damage to the ethical life** than any thing else. To put it in religious terms, capital is the devil. To show why this is the case, let me turn to capital's greatest critic, Karl Marx. Under capitalism, Marx writes, everything in nature and everything that human beings are and can do becomes an object: a resource for, or an obstacle, to the expansion of production, the development of technology, the growth of markets, and the circulation of money. For those who manage and live from capital, **nothing has value of its own**. Mountain streams, clean air, human lives -all mean nothing in themselves, but are valuable only if they can be used to turn a profit.[1] If capital looks at (not into) the human face, it sees there only eyes through which brand names and advertising can enter and mouths that can demand and consume food, drink, and tobacco products. If human faces express needs, then either products can be manufactured to meet, or seem to meet, those needs, or else, if the needs are incompatible with the growth of capital, then the faces expressing them must be unrepresented or silenced. Obviously what capitalist enterprises do have consequences for the well being of human beings and the planet we live on. Capital profits from the production of food, shelter, and all the necessities of life. The production of all these things uses human lives in the shape of labor, as well as the resources of the earth. If we care about life, if we see our obligations in each others faces, then we have to want all the things capital does to be governed by that care, to be directed by the ethical concern for life. But feeding people is not the aim of the food industry, or shelter the purpose of the housing industry. In medicine, making profits is becoming a more important goal than caring for sick people. As capitalist enterprises these activities aim single-mindedly at the accumulation of capital, and such purposes as caring for the sick or feeding the hungry becomes a mere means to an end, an instrument of corporate growth. Therefore ethics, the overriding commitment to meeting human need, is left out of deliberations about what the heavyweight institutions of our society are going to do. Moral convictions are expressed in churches, in living rooms, in letters to the editor, sometimes even by politicians and widely read commentators, but almost always with an attitude of resignation to the inevitable. People no longer say, “You can't stop progress,” but only because they have learned not to call economic growth progress. They still think they can't stop it. And they are right -- as long as the production of all our needs and the organization of our labor is carried out under private ownership. Only a minority (“idealists”) can take seriously a way of thinking that counts for nothing in real world decision making. Only when the end of capitalism is on the table will ethics have a seat at the table.

#### No fairness impact---we don’t wish away violence---they can hold us accountable for alt solvency---but, we’ll impact turn fairness

Richard Delgado ’92 (Charles Inglis Thomson Professor of Law, University of Colorado. J.D, University of California at Berkeley, “ESSAY SHADOWBOXING: AN ESSAY ON POWER”, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 813, Lexis)

It is important to know when we are being gulled, manipulated, and duped. n1 It is even more important to know when we are unwittingly doing this to ourselves -- when we are using shopworn legal scripts and counterscripts, going around endlessly in circles, getting nowhere. n2 Understanding how we use predictable arguments to rebut other predictable arguments in a predictable sequence -- "The plaintiff should have the freedom to do X," "No -- the defendant should have the security not to have X done to her"; "The law should be flexible, permitting us to do justice in particular cases," "No -- the law must be determinate; only bright-line rules are administrable and safe" n3 -- frees us to focus on real-world questions that do matter. We can begin to see how the actions we take as lawyers, law students, and legal scholars advance or retard principles we hold dear. n4 We can see where the scripts come from and, perhaps, how to write new and better ones. <Continues>

Underlying these stylized debates about subjective versus objective standards is a well-hidden issue of cultural power, one neatly concealed by elaborate arguments that predictably invoke predictable "principle." n25 These arguments invite us to take sides for or against abstract values that lie on either side of a well-worn analytical divide, having remarkably little to do with what is at stake. The arguments mystify and sidetrack, rendering us helpless in the face of powerful repeat players like corporations, human experimenters, action-loving surgeons, and sexually aggressive men. n26

How does this happen? Notice that in many cases it is the stronger party -- the tobacco company, surgeon, or male date -- that wants to apply an objective standard to a key event. n27 The doctor wants the law to require disclosure only of the risks and benefits the average patient would find material. n28 The male partygoer wants the law to ignore the woman's subjective thoughts in favor of her outward manifestations. n29 The tobacco company wants the warning on the package to be a stopper. Generally, the law complies.

What explains the stronger party's preference for an objective approach, and the other's demand for a more personalized one? It is not that one approach is more principled, more just, or even more [\*818] likely to produce a certain result than the other. Rather, in my opinion, the answer lies in issues of power and culture. It is now almost a commonplace that we construct the social world. n30 We do this through stories, narratives, myths, and symbols -- by using tools that create images, categories, and pictures. n31 Over time, through repetition, the dominant stories seem to become true and natural, and are accepted as "the way things are." n32 Recently, outsider jurisprudence n33 has been developing means, principally "counterstorytelling," to displace or overturn these comfortable majoritarian myths and narratives. n34 A well-told counterstory can jar or displace the dominant account. n35

The debate on objective and subjective standards touches on these issues of world-making and the social construction of reality. Powerful actors, such as tobacco companies and male dates, want objective standards applied to them simply because these standards always, and already, reflect them and their culture. These actors have been in power; their subjectivity long ago was deemed "objective" and imposed on the world. n36 Now their ideas about meaning, action, and fairness are built into our culture, into our view of malefemale, doctor-patient, and manufacturer-consumer relations. n37

<continues>

I began by observing that law-talk can lull and gull us, tricking us into thinking that categories like objective and subjective, and the stylized debates that swirl about them, really count when in fact they either collapse or appear trivial when viewed from the perspective of cultural power. If we allow ourselves to believe that these categories do matter, we can easily expend too much energy replicating predictable, scripted arguments -- and in this way, the law turns once-progressive people into harmless technocrats. n70

#### No education impact---we’re a topic specific K---the impact and link debate also prove we link turn education---

**Their fixation with policymaking is underpinned by neoliberal rationality---the ideological partition between the haves and have-nots structures policy-making**

**Gunder & Hillier ‘9** (Michael, Senior planning lecturer in the School of Architecture and Planning at the University of Auckland, Jean, Professor of Town and Country Planning at School of Architecture, Newcastle University, *Planning in Ten Words or Less: A Lacanian Entanglement with Spatial Planning*, pgs. 111-112)

The hegemonic network, or bloc, initially shapes the debates and draws on appropriate policies of desired success, such as the needs of bohemians, knowledge clusters, or talented knowledge workers, as to what constitutes *their* desired enjoyment (cobblestones, chrome and cappuccinos at sidewalk cafes) and what is therefore lacking in local competitiveness. In turn, this defines what is blighted and dysfunctional and in need of economic, spatial planning, or other, remedy. Such an argument is predicated on a logic, or more accurately a rhetoric, that a lack of a particular defined type of enjoyment, or competitiveness (for surely they are one and the same) is inherently unhealthy for the aggregate social body. Lack and its resolution are generally presented as technical, rather than political issues. Consequently, technocrats in partnership with their 'dominant stakeholders' can ensure the impression of rationally seeking to produce happiness for the many, whilst, of course, achieving their stakeholders' specific interests (Gunder and Hillier 2007a, 469). The current 'post-democratic' milieu facilitates the above through avoidance of critical policy debate challenging favoured orthodox positions and policy approaches. Consideration of policy deficiencies, or alternative 'solutions', are eradicated from political debate so that while' token institutions of liberal democracy are retained, conflicting positions and arguments are negated (Stavrakakis 2003, 59). Consequently, 'the safe names in the field who feed the policy orthodoxy are repeatedly used, or their work drawn upon, by different stakeholders, while more critical voices are silenced by their inability to shape policy debates' (Boland 2007, 1032). **The economic development** or spatial planning **policy analyst thus continues to partition reality ideologically by deploying only the orthodox** 'successful' or 'best practice' **economic development** or spatial planning **responses**. **This** further **maintains the** dominant, or **hegemonic, status quo while providing 'a cover and shield against critical thought by acting in the manner of a "buffer" isolating the political field from any research that is independent** and radical in its conception as in its implications for public policy' (Wacquant 2004, 99). At the same time, **adoption of the hegemonic orthodoxy tends to generate similar policy responses for every competing local area or city-region, largely resulting in a zero-sum game** (Blair and Kumar 1997)*.* In the race for global competitiveness, city-region authorities continue toprioritise economic development and supporting spatial planning policies. Theymaintain the dominant *status quo* by appearing to increase the happiness of material well being for all. The state, its local government and its governance structures,must be seen to be doing something to justify their existence. In addition, andperhaps more importantly, public sector actions, which give the appearance ofdoing something to improve the local economy and the city-region's amenity,actually address the (primal) desire of most people in society for at least the illusionof a safe and assured happy future of security and prosperity. Even if practitionerscan only deliver this as a fantasy-scenario by providing the potential of a limitedmaterial increase in happiness for some, even when this may not really be whatis actually wanted, this type of response is more acceptable to politicians and thevoting public than is the truth that to sate the wants and desires of everyone is an impossibility (Gunder 2003a, 2003b).

#### Focus on textual representations is exactly what we’re criticizing---the plan text conceals complex social relations that influence how the plan is enacted

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In anthropology, overstatement of the capacity of international development to objectify and control third world people, and the mistaken idea that donors rule through representations, arises in part from the fact that, at first, critics of development gave so much importance to donor policy texts as representations of discourse: their history-suppressing genre of technical optimism (Apthorpe 1996, 1997; Gasper, 1996), their aesthetics (Stirrat 2000), the scientific knowledge they assert and the politics they conceal (Booth 1994; Chambers 1997; Sachs 1992), their construction of places, problems and substitutable expertise (Ferguson 1994; Mitchell 2002), or the way they label the subjects of development (Wood 1985). Recent work challenges the implicit ‘discursive determinism’ (Moore 2000: 657). As I have argued elsewhere:

precisely because such a large proportion of the time and expertise of development personnel is organised with reference to writing and negotiating texts, they cannot be read at face value without reference to the arguments, interests and divergent points of view that they encode and to which they allude ... [donor] design texts have to be interpreted backwards to reveal the social relations that produced them, the future contests they anticipate and the wider ‘discourse coalitions’ (Fairhead and Leach 2002: 9) they are intended to call forth. In short, a sociology of the document is needed to ‘dispel the discursive hold of the text’. (Apthorpe [1996]: 16). (Mosse 2005a: 15)

Several studies have now begun to examine how the organising policy ideas and ‘universal codes and principles’ for poverty reduction or managed liberalisation are produced and legitimised socially (Soederberg 200: 14; cf. Crawford 200). In doing so anthropologists focus not only on texts but also on the practices of closed epistemic communities, policy networks, the managed agenda-setting consultations and consultant experts (including themselves), and the consensus formation involved in manufacturing transferable expert knowledge (Mosse 2005a: 12–56). Here policy ideas (especially ambiguous ones like good governance, ownership or civil society) take social form, being important less for what they say than for who they bring together; how they enrol, unite or divide (2005a). By looking at the power and professional life of experts across disciplinary, institutional and global/local divides, within and between epistemic and advocacy networks, research examines how universal models are produced in socially specific contexts (Grammig 2002; Mosse 2005a; Stubbs 2004; Wood 1998).19

## AT: Discourse Bad

#### No link – this is talking about discourse separated from materiality – our argument is that the rhetoric of development is used to create reality – it’s a prior question which none of their evidence is in the context of

#### Discourse shapes reality in the context of development---star this card

Cornwall ‘7 (Andrea – Prof. and social anthropologist specialising in the anthropology of participation and democracy, masculinities, women's empowerment and women's rights, and sexualities—Sussex University and Institute of Development Studies; “Buzzwords and Fuzzwords: Deconstructing Development Discourse”; August 2007; JStor)

Words make worlds. The language of development defines worlds-in-the-making, animating and justifying intervention in currently existing worlds with fulsome promises of the possible. Wolfgang Sachs contends, 'development is much more than just a socio-economic endeavour; it is a perception which models reality, a myth which comforts societies, and a fantasy which unleashes passions' (1992:1). These models, myths, and passions are sustained by development's **'buzzwords'**. Writing from diverse locations, contributors to this special issue critically examine a selection of the words that constitute today's development lexicon. Whereas those who contributed to Sachs' 1992 landmark publication The Development Dictionary shared a project of dismantling the edifice of development, this collection is deliberately eclectic in its range of voices, positions, and perspectives. Some tell tales of the trajectories that these words have travelled, as they have moved from one domain of discourse to another; others describe scenes in which the ironies - absurdities, at times - of their usage beg closer critical attention; others peel off the multiple guises that their words have assumed, and analyse the dissonant agendas that they embrace. Our intention in bringing them together is to leave you, the reader, feeling less than equivocal about taking for granted the words that frame the world-making projects of the development enterprise.

The lexicon of development

For those involved in development practice, reflection on words and their meanings may seem irrelevant to the real business of getting things done. Why, after all, should language matter to those who are doing development? As long as those involved in development practice are fam iliar with the catch-words that need to be sprinkled liberally in funding proposals and embla zoned on websites and promotional material, then surely there are more important things to be done than sit around mulling over questions of semantics? But language does matter for development. Development's buzzwords are not only passwords to funding and influence; and they are more than the mere specialist jargon that is characteristic of any profession. The word development itself, Gilbert Rist observes, has become a 'modern shibboleth, an una voidable password', which comes to be used 'to convey the idea that tomorrow things will be better, or that more is necessarily better'. But, as he goes on to note, the very taken-for-granted quality of 'development' - and the same might be said of many of the words that are used in development discourse - leaves much of what is actually done in its name unquestioned.

## AT: Perm

#### The inclusion of the short-term “call to action” in the form of the plan is a link and also means the perm can’t access our offense

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(“From ‘Rogue’ to ‘Failed’ States? The Fallacy of Short-termism” Politics 24 (3) p. Wiley Interscience))

Calls for alternative approaches to the phenomenon of state failure are often met with the criticism that such alternatives could only work in the long term whereas 'something' needs to be done here and now. Whilst recognising the need for immediate action, it is the role of the political scientist to point to the fallacy of 'short-termism' in the conduct of current policy. Short-termism is defined by Ken Booth (1999, p. 4) as 'approaching security issues within the time frame of the next election, not the next generation'. Viewed as such, short-termism is the enemy of true strategic thinking. The latter requires policymakers to rethink their long-term goals and take small steps towards achieving them. It also requires heeding against taking steps that might eventually become self-defeating. The United States has presently fought three wars against two of its Cold War allies in the post-Cold War era, namely, the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Both were supported in an attempt to preserve the delicate balance between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Cold War policy of supporting client regimes has eventually backfired in that US policymakers now have to face the instability they have caused. Hence the need for a comprehensive understandingof state failure and the role Western states have played in failing them through varied forms of intervention. Although some commentators may judge that the road to the existing situation is paved with good intentions, a truly strategic approach to the problem of international terrorism requires a more sensitive consideration of the medium-to-long-term implications of state building in different parts of the world whilst also addressing the root causes of the problem of state 'failure'. Developing this line of argument further, reflection on different socially relevant meanings of 'state failure' in relation to different time increments shaping policymaking might convey alternative considerations. In line with John Ruggie (1998, pp. 167–170), divergent issues might then come to the fore when viewed through the different lenses of particular time increments. Firstly, viewed through the lenses of an incremental time frame, more immediate concerns to policymakers usually become apparent when linked to precocious assumptions about terrorist networks, banditry and the breakdown of social order within failed states. Hence relevant players and events are readily identified (al-Qa'eda), their attributes assessed (axis of evil, 'strong'/'weak' states) and judgements made about their long-term significance (war on terrorism). The key analytical problem for policymaking in this narrow and blinkered domain is the one of choice given the constraints of time and energy devoted to a particular decision. These factors lead policymakers to bring conceptual baggage to bear on an issue that simplifies but also distorts information. Taking a second temporal form, that of a conjunctural time frame, policy responses are subject to more fundamental epistemological concerns. Factors assumed to be constant within an incremental time frame are more variable and it is more difficult to produce an intended effect on ongoing processes than it is on actors and discrete events. For instance, how long should the 'war on terror' be waged for? Areas of policy in this realm can therefore begin to become more concerned with the underlying forces that shape current trajectories. Shifting attention to a third temporal form draws attention to still different dimensions. Within an epochal time frame an agenda still in the making appears that requires a shift in decision-making, away from a conventional problem-solving mode 'wherein doing nothing is favoured on burden-of-proof grounds', towards a risk-averting mode, characterised by prudent contingency measures. To conclude, in relation to 'failed states', the latter time frame entails reflecting on the very structural conditions shaping the problems of 'failure' raised throughout the present discussion, which will demand lasting and delicate attention from practitioners across the academy and policymaking communities alike.

#### Specifically this call to action prevents reflection like the alternative

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Yet, the phenomenon of state 'failure' defies generalisation. One brash rendering of the 'failed states' approach gauges degrees of 'stateness' along a continuum starting with those states that meet classical Weberian criteria of statehood and ending with those that meet none of these criteria of 'successful' statehood (Gros, 1996). In common with attempts elsewhere (Carment, 2003), the goal is to assess states in order to assist in 'calibrating' the conditions for successful intervention. As a result, a taxonomy of 'failed states' has been developed by Gros (1996) ranging from so-called 'anarchic states' (Somalia, Liberia), to 'phantom' or 'mirage states' (Zaïre/Democratic Republic of Congo), to 'anaemic states' (Haiti), to 'captured states' (Rwanda) or 'aborted states' (Angola, Mozambique). Paraphrasing Mark Duffield (2001, p. 13), this view of conflict zones is akin to Victorian butterfly collectors constructing lists and typologies of the different species identified. The problem is that the **ar**bitrary and discriminatory nature of such taxonomy is barely recognised. Yet precisely such arbitrariness characterises the diagnoses of state failure within Western foreign policymaking. This, in turn, has implications for practices of intervention (Duffield, 2002; Ottaway, 2002). Furthermore, as Jennifer Milliken and Keith Krause (2002b, pp. 753–755) have argued, prevailing understandings of 'state failure' rest on assumptions about ' "stateness" against which any given state should be measured as having succeeded or failed'. The point being that presenting the experience of developing states as 'deviations' from the norm does not only reinforce commonly held assumptions about 'ideal' statehood but also inhibits reflectionon the binary opposition of 'failed' versus 'successful' states. This approach is symptomatic of the prevalence of Cold War discourses that revolve around such binary oppositions (e.g. Jackson, 1990). Although preventing state failure is presented as a primary concern in tackling the problem of insecurity in the developing world, this is still largely shaped by the persistence of Cold War discourses. As Jack Straw has admitted, in the ostensibly post-Cold War era, 'the East and West no longer needed to maintain extensive spheres of influence through financial and other forms of assistance to states whose support they wanted. So the bargain between the major powers and their client states unravelled'.15 The result, in his view, is again the perfusion of warlords, criminals, drug barons or terrorists that fill the vacuum within failed states and hence, despite the controversy it may court, there is 'no doubt' that the domino theory applies to the 'chaos' of failed states.16